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ABSTRACT
An Empirical Analysis of
Book-Tax Reporting Difference and
Tax Noncompliance Behavior in China
by
TANG Feng
Master of Philosophy

The traditional accounting system in China was directly linked to the tax
assessment. The close linkage between the two sets of reporting rules has
substantially weakened, as China promulgated a series of accounting standards and
regulations in the late 1990s. As a result, accounting for financial reporting purposes
does not have to conform to accounting for tax reporting purposes. This divergence
between the two measures of income will inevitably cause accounting book income
to differ from taxable income. This is because the more the excess of book income
over taxable income, the more the magnitude of tax audit adjustments. Mills (1998)
suggests that book tax difference is an indicator of a firm’s tax noncompliance. This
implies that additional tax-related costs may arise when accounting book income is
higher than taxable income, and these costs may have an impact on the tradeoff
between tax incentives and financial reporting incentives.
Based on data from the Chinese stock market, this study tests empirically
whether book tax differences due to the tradeoff between tax and non-tax cost results
in tax audit adjustments. I hypothesize that the magnitude of tax noncompliance
increases as book tax differences increase, and this relationship is stronger after the
departure of financial reporting from tax rules in China. The results provide evidence
in support of the hypothesis. This study extends prior research and contributes to the
understanding of tax and non-tax tradeoffs in a different context. The results have
rich implications for corporate managers and policymakers in other developing
countries experiencing a similar transition from a tax-based accounting system to a
system that gives corporate managers considerable discretion over the choice of
accounting methods. One implication is that although book tax delinking may
improve the usefulness of financial reports, it could weaken the perceived equity of
the tax system and increase corporate tax avoidance behavior. Therefore, when
setting accounting standards, policy makers should not only look at the impact of
information relevance on the capital market, but also consider the consequence of
these standards on government revenue.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

This chapter summarizes the motivation of this study, research objective and
main findings. Theoretical contributions and practical implications are also discussed
at large.

1.1 Motivation
With the rapid economic development of China and its entry into the World
Trade Organization, China’s accounting and tax regulations have gone through great
revisions in the last few years. Traditional accounting systems in China have been
criticized as being incapable of reflecting the truth and fairness of a financial
situation, and tax-oriented accounting rules have been regarded as a major barrier
impeding accounting harmonization with international accounting practices (Gao,
2001; Liu, 2001; Gao, 2003). Since the late 1990s, a series of accounting standards
and new accounting systems have been promulgated, and as a result, the close link
between accounting and tax has been gradually removed. In particular, the new
comprehensive Accounting System for Business Enterprises issued on December 29,
2000 has led to substantive separation of accounting and tax treatments, and thus,
accounting for financial reporting purposes does not necessarily have to conform to
accounting for tax reporting purposes. This divergence of accounting and tax rules
generally causes accounting book income to differ from taxable income.
Mills (1998) suggests that book tax difference (i.e., the difference between
book income and taxable income) is an indication of tax noncompliance, and the
more the excess of book income over taxable income, the more the magnitude of tax
1

audit adjustments. This implies that additional tax-related costs may arise when
accounting income is higher than taxable income, and that these additional costs have
an impact on the tradeoff between tax incentives and financial reporting incentives.
Therefore, it would be most interesting to examine the relationship between book tax
difference and tax noncompliance in China’s specific situations.
Tax noncompliance behavior is attracting the interest of increasing numbers
of researchers, and has become a booming research area in accounting. As
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) summarize, three areas in tax research – tax and
non-tax cost tradeoffs, taxes and asset prices, and multijurisdictional, have been
emerging in recent years. Most empirical studies focus on the tax and non-tax cost
tradeoffs, especially the tradeoff between tax incentives and financial reporting
considerations (Cloyd et al., 1996; Mills, 1996, 1998; Mills and Newberry, 2001).
Other studies examine the factors that affect tax noncompliance behavior (e.g., Rice,
1992; Bradley, 1994). However, most of this line of research was carried out based
on data from developed economies, especially the US. Research on tax
noncompliance behavior in developing economies is limited. While Chan and Mo
(2000, 2002) study how tax holiday positions and corporate characteristics are
associated with tax noncompliance of foreign investment enterprises in China, they
have not directly examined the impact of book tax differences originating from the
tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs on tax noncompliance behavior in China.

1.2 Research Objective
As significant reforms of accounting and tax rules have occurred in China
since the late 1990s, the objective of the study is to investigate whether book tax
differences arising from the separation of accounting and tax regulations lead to tax
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noncompliance by listed companies in China. Specifically, this study attempts to test
empirically whether book tax differences due to the tradeoff management makes
between tax and non-tax costs result in tax audit adjustments on the companies listed
in China’s capital markets, and whether the relationship differs in the periods of prevs. post-delinking of book tax reporting rules. I hypothesize that the magnitude of tax
noncompliance will increase as book tax difference increases, especially after 2001
when financial reporting was detached from tax reporting. Following Chan and Mo
(2002), I use the amount of tax audit adjustments required by tax authorities to proxy
for the magnitude of tax noncompliance. Data used for the study were collected from
companies’ annual reports, prospectuses, announcements, and other publicized
documents, as well as tax returns from tax authorities and CPA firms.

1.3 Main findings
Based on 2,207 firm-year observations during the period 1998-2003, the
regression results suggest that book tax difference and tax audit adjustment are
positively related. Moreover, this relationship is significantly stronger after 2001
than before. I estimate that as book tax difference increases by one unit, tax audit
adjustment will be greater during the post- than the pre-delinking period to the extent
of 0.05% of sales revenue. This implies that while it may facilitate business decisionmaking and is more consistent with the “true and fair” view concept, book tax
separation may reduce tax compliance levels and increase tax audit costs.

3

1.4 Significance of the study
1.4.1 Theoretical contributions
This research extends Mills’ (1998) study to the Chinese context, which is
dramatically different from that in the US, and the empirical evidence obtained
contributes to the prior literature in the following three aspects. First, the results
suggest that book tax difference leads to tax audit adjustment by the Chinese tax
authorities, which confirms that book tax difference is a useful indicator of tax
noncompliance behavior in China when substantial book tax separation occurs. That
is, in the context of China, the magnitude of book tax difference, resulting from
corporate managers’ decisions on the choice of financial accounting and tax
treatments, may also incur tax authorities’ increased scrutiny of corporate tax
reporting. Second, based on the tax and non-tax costs tradeoff theory developed in
the literature, I argue that tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs operated differently before
book tax separation in China compared with the tradeoffs in the US, and that they
become somewhat similar after book tax delinking in both countries. In other words,
the application of tax and non-tax costs tradeoff theory is applicable in China with
some necessary modification. That is, before book tax separation, managers simply
trade off the relative importance of financial reporting and tax reporting without
considering additional tax-related costs, while after book tax separation, additional
tax-related costs (such as tax examination costs and tax fines) originating from book
tax difference should be taken into account. Finally, the empirical evidence
contributes to the Scholes-Wolfson framework which attempts to explain the role of
taxes in organizations (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992; Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001).
That is, to some extent, tax does have an impact on Chinese managers’ financial
decisions. Managers should consider “all parties”, “all taxes”, and “all costs” to
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achieve effective tax planning, and tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs affect managers’
choice of financial and tax reporting treatments. Therefore, for researchers interested
in studying tax noncompliance in transitional economies such as China, all tax and
non-tax related factors should be included in the analysis. Omitting otherwise
relevant variables could confound the test results.
1.3.2 Practical implications
The results of the study are rich in implications. From the perspective of
corporate managers, the results suggest that while the separation of book tax
regulations may provide opportunities for tax planning and earnings management,
firms cannot costlessly manipulate book income and taxable income independently
without incurring probable tax examination costs. From the perspective of
accounting and tax policy makers, the results suggest that while the detachment of
the two sets of rules may improve the usefulness of financial reports, it could weaken
the perceived equity of the tax system and increase the tax noncompliance level, as
the tax authorities have to put great efforts into detecting potential tax violations by
carrying out in-depth tax audits. Therefore, when policy makers set financial
accounting standards, they should not only look at the impact of the true and fair
view concept on the capital market, but also consider the effect of these standards on
tax revenue forfeited due to noncompliance.
Moreover, the results of this study may be irradiative for other countries.
Relationships between accounting and tax systems tend to vary among countries.
Generally, there are three types of book tax systems around the world (OECD, 1987;
Porcano & Tran, 1998; Eberhartinger, 1999; Lamb, Nobes, and Roberts, 1998; Haller,
1992; Takatera and Daigo, 1989; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000). In the first,
accounting rules are significantly affected by tax rules. No book entries contrary to
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tax rules are allowed in financial reporting. Typical countries using the tax-based
accounting system include Brazil, India, Mexico, Norway, Japan, and Russia. 1 In
these countries, the major users of financial reports are government agencies and
financial institutions. As the objective of financial reporting is to provide information
to these homogeneous groups of users, uniform financial reports conforming to tax
reporting are adequate to serve the purpose. As such, accounting rules and tax rules
conform in all aspects. Although there may be less tax noncompliance, tax-oriented
financial accounting information may not truly reflect the financial position and
operating results of the companies. Hence, Porcano and Tran (1998) suggest that a
certain degree of separation of the two rules may be beneficial. In the second,
accounting rules are independent of tax rules. That is, financial reporting is based on
accounting rules, while tax reporting is based on an independent framework outside
financial accounting principles. Countries adopting this type of system include
Australia, Canada, Demark, Ireland, Netherlands, and New Zealand, the UK, and the
US. As pointed out by Mills (1996), government enforcement costs are high when
tax rules and accounting rules are not closely related. Further, preparing financial
reports and tax reports separately may not be cost effective both for individual
taxpayers and for the society. Since conformity of accounting and tax rules may
improve the perceived equity of the tax system, reduce tax compliance costs, and
enhance tax compliance levels, there has been a call for a reasonable book-tax
alignment in these countries (Porcano and Tran, 1998).
In the third, financial accounting is based on generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP), with some exceptions to meet specific tax purposes. Tax
reporting, to some extent, depends on financial reporting. They are relevant to each
1

In fact, reforms have recently occurred in all these countries except Brazil, leading to some degree of
separation between accounting and tax rules (Alexander and Schwencke, 1997; Takatera and Daigo,
1989; Rahman et al., 2004; Motorin, 2000).
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other, but not strictly in conformity. Countries using this type of system include
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and
Sweden. While the main users of financial information in the first category tend to be
the government, the major users in the second and third categories are more
diversified and include investors, bankers, creditors, and the public. In order to
satisfy the needs of these heterogenous groups of users, accounting for financial
reporting and accounting for tax reporting cannot be in conformity for all business
transactions. While financial reporting is independent of tax reporting in the second
category, the two systems are interdependent in the third category. In countries in the
last category, accounting rules and tax rules are not the same under certain
circumstances, in order to achieve accounting harmonization with international
practice and to fulfill the differential objectives of the two systems simultaneously.
As China can also be classified, respectively, into the first and the last category preand post-2000, its experience can provide a useful reference for other countries
undergoing similar transitions, especially for major developing countries, such as
India, Brazil, and Mexico.

1.5 Organization of the thesis
The organization of the remaining chapters is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews
the prior literature on tax noncompliance and discusses the tax and non-tax costs
tradeoff theory. Chapter 3 provides the institutional background on the development
of China’s accounting and tax regulations. Chapter 4 develops the research
hypothesis. Chapter 5 describes the research methods, including data collection,
sample selection, and the regression model. Chapter 6 presents empirical results.
Chapter 7 concludes, and discusses some limitations and further research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review

Research in taxation is becoming an increasingly important area of research
in accounting. This chapter reviews in detail studies on tax noncompliance and tax
non-tax costs tradeoff theory in developed countries, and limited studies on tax
noncompliance in China.

2.1 Studies on tax noncompliance in developed economies
Due to the difficulty of data collection, there are not many studies on
corporate tax noncompliance behavior. Some studies have attempted to find the
organizational factors that affect tax noncompliance behavior. As commented by
MacKie-Mason (1992), Rice (1992) may be the first to have empirically examined
corporate tax evasion behavior. Rice (1992) examines small corporations’ tax
noncompliance behavior, and finds that while public information disclosure
requirements encourage tax compliance, marginal tax rates, firm size, and location in
a poor compliance region have a negative association with tax compliance. Bradley
(1994) examines the influence on tax compliance behavior of six factors –
complexity of tax law, supportive corporate environment, financial stress, perceived
costs of noncompliance, risk of audit adjustment, and personal compliance profile of
the corporate tax employee. She was the first to develop a set of scales to measure
these six potential factors. Murray (1995) focuses on sales tax compliance, and finds
that firm size affects tax noncompliance, that is, newer firms are more tax compliant
than older firms.

8

The majority of previous studies on tax noncompliance are based on the tax
and non-tax costs tradeoff theory, especially the tradeoff between tax related costs
and financial reporting cost. As Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) summarize, the tax
and non-tax costs tradeoff has been one of the major areas of tax research in
accounting. Selected papers are reviewed in the following section.

2.2 Studies on tax and non-tax costs tradeoff
Tax and non-tax costs tradeoff theory originates from the framework
proposed by Scholes and Wolfson (1992), who attempt to investigate the role of
taxes in organizations by adopting a positive perspective. The Scholes-Wolfson
conceptual framework involves three central aspects, that is, all parties, all taxes and
all costs. Scholes and Wolfson state:
“Effective tax planning requires the planner to consider the tax implications of a
proposed transaction for all of the parties to the transaction.”
“Effective tax planning requires the planner, in making investment and financing
decisions, to consider not only explicit taxes (tax dollars paid directly to taxing authorities)
but also implicit taxes (taxes that are paid indirectly in the form of lower before-tax rates of
return on tax-favored investments.”
“Effective tax planning requires the planner to recognize that taxes represent only
one among many business costs, and all costs must be considered in the planning process: to
be implemented, some proposed tax plans may require exceedingly costly restructuring of
the business.” (Page 2)

The Scholes-Wolfson paradigm implies that managers should consider “all
parties”, “all taxes”, and “all costs” to achieve the goals of effective tax planning,
such as tax minimization. Minimizing the present value of tax-related costs should be
traded off with or weighed against other objectives, such as maximizing reported
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accounting income and the wealth of shareholders. Based on this framework, a
number of empirical studies have examined tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs,
particularly the tradeoff between financial reporting costs and tax costs in the US.
For example, Mills (1998) and Dhaliwal et al. (1994) examine the aggregate effects
of the tradeoff and the tradeoff in specific settings, such as LIFO inventory
accounting treatment and income shifting around the US tax reform in 1986.
Financial reporting costs, extensively addressed in earnings management literature
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, 1990; Healy and Wahlen, 1999), are those real or
perceived costs related to decreases in reported accounting income or shareholders’
equity (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). In many cases, tax planning will lead to
lower reported accounting income. Rational managers, attempting to realize the
objectives of effective tax planning, will evaluate the relative importance of tax
incentives and financial reporting incentives to maximize the expected benefits for
themselves and for the whole firm, as financial contracts (e.g., compensation plan
and debt contract) are often tied up with accounting income, and firms’ market value
is closely related to accounting numbers (Ball and Brown, 1968; Dechow, 1994;
Kothari, 2001; Nichols and Wahlen, 2004). As such, tax and non-tax costs tradeoff
can be used to investigate corporate tax noncompliance behavior.
Cloyd (1995) uses an experimental design, in which experienced tax
professionals responded to questions on two hypothetical scenarios. He finds that
when accounting treatment and tax treatment are ambiguous, tax preparers tradeoff
tax benefits against non-tax costs in the process of choosing methods for financial
accounting and tax reporting, as book tax conformity or nonconformity can have
influences on tax and non-tax costs or benefits. Specifically, when accounting and
tax treatment are not in conformity, tax preparers predict that the probability of being
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tax audited by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is higher and the probability of
successfully defending aggressive tax positions is lower; and it is the opposite case
when accounting and tax treatment are in conformity. Similarly, Cloyd et al. (1996)
use a mail survey to ask senior financial officers of selected large- and medium-sized
manufacturing companies to respond to questions in a short case. They also find that
tax reporting considerations have impacts on financial accounting choice, because
book-tax conformity decreases the probability of the IRS’s audit and scrutiny. From
the perspective of tax authorities, book tax difference is a “red flag” of aggressive tax
reporting. Moreover, public firms are less aggressive in tax noncompliance than
private firms, because of the higher non-tax costs they face.
Mills (1996) provides preliminary evidence that tax audit adjustments by the
IRS are related to the level of book tax conformity, which is also related to the
tradeoff between incentives of financial reporting and tax reporting. She also finds
some evidence that public firms generally have larger book tax differences than
private firms, supporting the hypothesis that public firms have stronger book
incentives relative to tax incentives than private firms. Using archival data, Mills
(1998) finds that the proposed audit adjustments by the IRS will be greater as booktax differences increase, indicating that corporate managers cannot costlessly
manipulate financial accounting reporting and tax reporting independently, as there
exist tradeoffs between current tax savings, costs of tax examination and financial
reporting benefits. The empirical results also suggest that public firms generally have
lower IRS proposed audit adjustments than private firms, because public firms face
more non-tax costs and thus are less aggressive in tax planning, The findings
triangulate the conclusions of Cloyd (1995) and Cloyd et al. (1996).
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Mills and Sansing (2000) attempt to formulate tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs
by constructing a stylized game theory tax compliance model. Their model considers
both taxpayers and the tax authority as strategic players, and predicts that book tax
difference is highly correlated with the chance of tax audit by the tax authority, but is
not related to detected understatements of tax liability. Specifically, they propose that
the probability of being tax audited increases as positive book tax difference
increases, and that the probability of additional tax costs incurred, conditional on
being audited, is similar, regardless of whether positive book tax difference is
generated or not. The strategic tax compliance model is empirically tested in the
study, and the results validate the model. Mills and Newberry (2001) also examine
tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs by public vs. private firms, and find evidence of the
effect of tax and non-tax costs on aggregate book tax reporting difference. Their
results also confirm that public firms generally report larger book tax difference than
private firms, due to higher financial reporting costs and thus fewer incentives for
conforming financial reporting to tax reporting. This implies that book tax difference
may be a stronger indicator of aggressive tax reporting for public firms than for
private firms.
In addition to these studies testing aggregate and general effects of tax and
non-tax tradeoffs on tax noncompliance behavior, other research focuses on a
number of specific settings, such as LIFO (Last In First Out) inventory accounting
treatment (Dhaliwal et al., 1994; Frankel, and Trezevant, 1994; Hunt et al., 1996),
management compensation (Matsunaga et al., 1992), capital structure and divestiture
(Maydew et al., 1999; Klassen, 1997), income shifting corresponding to the US Tax
Reform Act in 1986 (Scholes et al., 1992; Dhaliwal and Wang, 1992; Guenther, 1994;
Guenther et al., 1997; Maydew, 1997) and specific regulated industries (Scholes et
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al., 1990; Beatty et al., 1995; Beatty and Harris, 1999; Mikhail, 1999). All these
studies directly or indirectly suggest that tax and non-tax tradeoffs are related to tax
noncompliance behavior. For example, Guenther et al. (1997) provide evidence that
public firms which were required to switch from the cash method to the accrual
method for tax reporting purposes as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 deferred
income to later years at a lower tax rate. They argue that this behavior is consistent
with the tax and non-tax costs tradeoff arising from the tax reform. Beatty and Harris
(1999) and Mikhail (1999) examine banks and life insurance companies, and find
that tax considerations have a greater influence on private firms than on public firms.
The results suggest that private firms view tax savings as more important than
financial reporting benefits, and achieving optimal tax strategy is less costly for
private firms. Using a sample of major capital divestitures (i.e., large dispositions of
operating units), Klassen (1997) provides evidence that inside ownership
concentration has impacts on the tradeoff between book and tax incentives. He finds
that the financial reporting consequences of tax planning strategies are less important
where firm ownership is concentrated in the hands of relatively few owners, and thus
manager-owned companies tend to put a higher priority on tax planning, because
they are less sensitive to financial reporting costs.

2.3 Studies on tax noncompliance in developing economies
Although there is an increasing number of empirical studies in the developed
economy framework, particularly the US, studies on tax noncompliance behavior in
China are limited. The exception to this is the study by Chan and Mo (2000). By
obtaining tax audit data from selected Chinese tax bureau, they measure tax
noncompliance as tax audit adjustments required by the tax authorities, and find
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empirical evidence to suggest that tax noncompliance behavior of foreign investment
enterprises is significantly affected by their tax holiday positions. Specifically, they
find that companies’ least compliant behavior occurs in the pre-holiday periods,
while their most compliant behavior occurs in the tax-exemption period. They also
find that companies have long-term considerations on tax noncompliance strategy,
and that some firm characteristics, such as activity orientation, technology status,
form of investment and inside ownership concentration, influence noncompliance.
Chan and Mo (2002) extend their previous study of 2000 by decomposing tax audit
adjustments into book-tax conforming adjustments and book-tax difference
adjustments to investigate the impact of firm characteristics on tax noncompliance.
Book-tax conforming tax audit adjustments represent those adjustments that affect
both accounting income and taxable income, while book-tax difference tax audit
adjustments represent those adjustments that affect only taxable income. The
decomposition is a useful starting point to study different incentives and forms of
noncompliance and helps better analyze tax noncompliance behavior. Chan and Mo
(2002) find that firm characteristics have a significant impact on book-tax
conforming adjustments and book-tax difference adjustments. Specifically, they find
that export-oriented and high-tech foreign investment enterprises generally have
larger book-tax conforming noncompliance, while domestic-oriented and non-hightech foreign investment enterprises have larger book-tax difference noncompliance.
These results also reflect tax and non-tax tradeoffs faced by corporate managers
when they try to achieve a certain business goal.
In summary, tax noncompliance has been an important research area in the
last two decades. While the majority of studies conducted in the US examine how
organizational factors and tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs influence tax
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noncompliance, few studies have been carried out in China. This study contributes to
the literature by investigating the effect of tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs on tax
noncompliance in a transitional economy framework. The specific situations
concerning the evolution of accounting and tax rules are described in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Institutional Background

This chapter describes the specific situations concerning the evolution of
accounting and tax rules in China, including the periods of book tax conformity and
book tax separation. Differential interactions of accounting and tax rules in China
and the US are also discussed.

3.1 The interaction of accounting and tax rules in China
3.1.1 Book tax conformity
The traditional accounting system in China was directly linked to the fiscal
budget and tax assessment. Before 1978, China adopted the fiscal policy of “unified
receipts and allocations by the state”. That is, profits earned by state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) were handed over to the state; their losses incurred were covered
by the state; and the funds they needed were allocated by the state. There were no
personal or enterprise income taxes, and thus no tax policy. Accounting simply
facilitates fiscal policy to fulfill its budgetary resource allocation function. In 1979,
the government introduced the profit retention system, under which SOEs were
allowed to retain a portion of their profit. The chief objective of this reform was to
provide incentives for enterprises to increase production and profits. However, the
profit retention rate was highly discretionary and differentiated, as it was based on ad
hoc, one-to-one negotiations between the enterprise and the government. In July
1983, the profit retention system was replaced by a tax remittance system in which
all SOEs paid standard income taxes according to the tax law. Tax laws have since
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played a significant role in financial reporting. The Ministry of Finance (MOF)
determines the tax rules, which in turn dictate accounting rules. Financial statements
and tax returns must conform in all respects for domestic enterprises. Consequently,
accounting income did not differ significantly from taxable income.2
In the early 1990s, significant revisions were made to China’s accounting and
tax regulations. For tax rules, the Income Tax Law for Foreign Investment
Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises was implemented in 1991, while the Enterprise
Income Tax Law (EIT) for domestic enterprises became effective in 1994. For
accounting regulations, the MOF promulgated Accounting Regulations for
Experimental Listed Companies in 1992 and “Two Standards and Two Systems” in
1993.3 These rules transformed the old accounting process tailored to the centrally
planned economy to the new one in accordance with the market economy. This was
the first attempt by the government to realize harmonization of China’s accounting
rules with international accounting practices (Liu and Zhang, 1996; Gao, 2001; Chen,
Sun, and Wang, 2002; Gao, 2003). For instance, six financial accounting elements –
asset, liability, equity, revenue, expense and earnings were defined for the first time,
a debit and credit double-entry bookkeeping system was adopted, and the outdated
financial statements were replaced by a commonly recognized balance sheet and
income statements. However, although some accounting and tax reforms have taken
place during this period, accounting treatment should still conform to tax rules in
most respects.
2

Although the MOF allows foreign investment enterprises to prepare their financial statements based
on international practices, the financial statements, even though they are drawn up in line with
international standards, are still considerably influenced by the tax rules (Liu and Zhang, 1996; Gao,
2001; Gao, 2003). For example, the Income Tax Law for Joint Ventures states that, where accounting
treatment adopted by the business contradicts tax regulation, tax rules prevail over general accounting
principles.
3

‘Two Standards’ refers to Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises – Basic Standard and
Enterprise Financial General Standards. ‘Two Systems’ refers to Enterprise Financial and
Accounting Systems.
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3.1.2 Book tax separation
Since the late 1990s, the close relationship between financial accounting and
accounting for tax purposes has been criticized by both academics and business
communities. The major criticism is that tax oriented financial reporting distorts both
the business decisions and “true and fair view” concept, and tax-driven accounting
standards are regarded as one of the major reasons for accounting disharmony with
internationally accepted practice (Liu, 2001; Gao, 2001; Gao, 2003). For example,
tax law stipulates that bad debt provisions should not exceed 0.3-0.5% of the ending
balances of accounts receivable. While the intent of this regulation is to prevent
companies from overstating expenses to reduce tax payments, it is likely that in fact
over 0.5% of accounts receivable may become uncollectible. If financial accounting
should conform to tax accounting, the presentation of financial statements for
external reporting may be distorted. Another example is the rules concerning
depreciation of capital assets. The tax law stipulates that the straight-line method
should be used except in some special cases, and specifies a minimum useful life for
different categories of capital assets. This regulation may also be incompatible with
the true and fair view, since the depreciation methods and the economic life of the
asset are not determined by the business according to its underlying business
conditions for the purposes of external reporting. A third instance is revenue
recognition. The tax law generally does not consider the risks related to revenue
realization. Ignoring risk factors may harm the decision usefulness of financial
accounting information, because users need relevant information not only on
expected returns, but also on potential risks.
In addition, critics argue that accounting rules should be independent of tax
rules because the objectives of the two sets of rules are quite different. While the
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primary objective of a tax system is to raise revenue for government programs, the
objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide information useful to
users for making and evaluating decisions about the use of firm resources. Since the
role of tax rules is revenue raising, it is reasonable to expect that certain provisions of
the tax law are designed to increase revenue and decrease deductions, which differs
from accounting rules. While financial reporting should reflect a number of
qualitative characteristics, such as relevance, reliability, comparability, and
consistency (SFAC No.2, 1980), the tax system should be equitable, efficient
(neutral), certain, and economical (Porcano and Tran, 1998). Whereas a certain
degree of flexibility may be allowed in financial reporting, uniformity is necessary
for tax reporting (Eberhartinger, 1999). Therefore, critics argue that accounting for
financial reporting and accounting for tax reporting should be delinked, to fulfill their
respective objectives and to satisfy their respective information qualities.
In light of domestic and international pressures, on January 1 1998, China
revised the Accounting Systems for Listed Companies, in an effort to relax the tax
oriented accounting principle, including the removal of rigid limits on bad debt
provisions and inventory and temporary investment valuation. In late 2000, the MOF
further revised the accounting system, and required shareholding companies to
comply with the new Accounting System for Business Enterprises effective on
January 1, 2001.4 The new accounting standards and system were designed to move
away from the close link between financial reporting and tax reporting.5 One of the
most significant changes was that listed companies are allowed to determine, based

4

The new Accounting System for Business Enterprises differs from the Enterprise Financial and
Accounting Systems effective in 1993, in that while the old systems differentiated enterprises in terms
of industry, the new system unified accounting treatments for all enterprises in different industries
except financial institutions.

5

Refer to Appendix I for a list of China’s accounting standards and systems issued by 2003.
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on their specific situations, the amounts of eight free-choice provisions, including
bad debt provision, provision on impairment of inventories, current investments,
long-term investments, fixed assets, construction in process, intangible assets, and
consigned loans. These provisions can be charged into corresponding costs, expenses
or losses accounts for financial reporting purposes, but they are not deductible from
taxable income. Thus, large book tax differences may be generated. While this
improves greatly the information quality of financial accounting, the accounting
reform leads to more items of differential treatments for financial reporting and tax
reporting. With regard to tax regulations, the State Administration of Taxation issued
Measures on Enterprise Income Tax Pretax Deductions on May 16, 2000, which
specifies items deductible from taxable income. A number of supplementary
documents were subsequently published in 2003 to clarify ambiguous areas of tax
treatment which differ from accounting rules. The new system, together with sixteen
specific accounting standards, has caused accounting regulations to substantially
depart from tax regulations since 2001.6
Appendix III describes the major divergence of the two sets of rules. This
divergence can be grouped into the following five categories: 1) differences in the
timing of recognition of sales and cost of sales; 2) differences in the method of
determining bad debt, management fees, R&D expenses, and entertainment expenses;
3) differences in treating certain operating expenses, such as advertising expenses,
commission and insurance expenses, etc.; 4) differences in handling finance
expenditures relating to the cost of debt; and 5) differences in the treatment of nonoperating expenses such as donations, tax late-payment surcharges and penalties, loss
arising from debt restructuring, etc. Under these circumstances, accounting income
6

Refer to Appendix II for the flowchart of significant reforms of accounting and tax rules in China
since the early 1990s.
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prepared under China’s GAAP is expected to be different from taxable income
prepared under the tax regulations, and companies are allowed to make any entries in
their books of account that are contrary to the tax rules. Companies are required to
strictly comply with the new accounting system when recognizing revenue, costs,
expenses and losses, and preparing financial accounting statements. When filing tax
returns, companies need not change book-keeping documents, but instead adjust tax
returns only, if accounting income and taxable income are not in conformity due to
differences on the bases and timing of income recognition and calculation.
The departure of accounting regulations from tax regulations will inevitably
cause book income to differ significantly from taxable income. Although the
departure of the two accounting schemes may have increased harmonization with
international norms, the flight-from-tax financial accounting rules may also have
provided management with opportunities to manipulate both book income and
taxable income, and have as a result increased difficulties for tax authorities in tax
collection and investigation.

3.2 Comparison of book tax interaction in China and the US
In the US, financial accounting rules and tax rules are generally regarded as
two separate systems with little conformity. An examination of the historical
development of these two rules in the US reveals that book tax conformity existed
prior to the 1950s, and the two sets of rules separated gradually over time (Porcano
and Tran, 1998). At first, tax rules were fundamentally dependent on accounting
rules. Taxable income was determined in accordance with GAAP, and was calculated
based on books of account. The alignment of book tax regulations was designed to
ensure that proper accounting methods were used to clearly reflect income. However,
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since the 1960s, the extent of reliance of tax reporting on accounting rules began to
decrease, because of the divergent objectives of the accounting and tax systems.
According to the current Internal Revenue Code (IRC), tax rules do not conform to
accounting rules in most aspects, except in the case of inventory valuation (Lamb,
Nobes, and Roberts, 1998). That is, if the LIFO method is used for tax reporting
purposes, it should also be used for financial reporting (Mills, 1998). There are also
some minor areas where book tax conformity exists, such as fixed asset valuation
and research and development expenditure (Lamb, Nobes, and Roberts, 1998).
As described above, book income was detached from taxable income during
the late 1990s in China. Although there are quite a number of items, stipulated in
accounting and tax regulations, where financial accounting treatments and tax
treatments are not the same, determination of taxable income is still based on
accounting income. Taxable income is calculated by starting from book income and
making some adjustments to reach the final amount. The two sets of rules are not
separate in China to the same extent as in the US. As mentioned in Chapter 1, China
belongs to the third type of relationship between accounting and tax regulations,
whereas the US falls into the second type of relationship. Therefore, the book tax
interaction in China is not the same as that in the US. Due to independence of
accounting and tax rules in the US and interdependence of the two systems in China,
tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs may differ. This difference may result in a differential
relationship between book tax difference and tax noncompliance behavior in these
two countries.
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Chapter 4
Hypothesis Development

As mentioned above, there have been increasing studies on tax
noncompliance in developed countries, especially in the US, and theories and
hypotheses in this line of research are well developed and empirically tested.
However, few studies focus on tax noncompliance behavior in developing economies.
Although no country can be immune to tax noncompliance, there is, however, a
likelihood that more tax abuses are encountered in developing countries than in
developed countries, as developing countries generally lack infrastructure and
experience in tax administration. Further, the separation of accounting and tax
regulations in China provides a unique opportunity to study the relationship between
book tax difference and tax noncompliance. In this chapter, I develop the hypothesis
about the impact of book tax differences arising from the separation of the two sets
of rules on tax noncompliance by using relevant conclusions drawn from the
experience in the US and also considering China’s unique institutional background.

4.1 Relationship between book tax difference and tax noncompliance
during the period 1998-2000
Prior research conducted in the US indicates that tax noncompliance behavior
is affected by corporate managers’ tax and non-tax considerations. Mills (1998)
argues that book tax differences represent aggressive tax reporting of the firm, and
thus the more book income exceeds taxable income, the greater are the proposed
audit adjustments by the tax authorities. While this relation between book tax
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difference and tax audit adjustments may be evident in the US, where the accounting
rules are independent of tax rules, it may not be applicable to the Chinese context
prior to 2001 when accounting and tax regulations were largely aligned. Before 2001,
financial accounting treatments and tax treatments conformed in most aspects, and
thus there were few instances where accounting income differed from taxable income.
In such a context, book tax differences may not be an effective signal of tax
noncompliance behavior. Specifically, if corporate managers lower taxable income,
book income will also be lowered by a similar amount, and vice versa. There is
limited room for management to manipulate book income and taxable income
separately and simultaneously to achieve certain business goals. Therefore, book tax
difference may not be correlated to tax audit adjustments in this circumstance.

4.2 Relationship between book tax difference and tax noncompliance
during the period 2001-2003
As described earlier, China has undergone major reforms in its accounting
and tax systems since the late 1990s. Particularly in 2001, a series of accounting
regulations were promulgated and implemented. Appendix II lists a number of
accounting rules which were put into effect in 2001. These new regulations directly
or indirectly cause financial accounting to depart from tax accounting. In particular,
the issuance of the Accounting System for Business Enterprises effective on 1
January 2001 can be seen as a milestone of substantial book tax separation.
Appendix III describes the major items for which the accounting treatments
stipulated in the new accounting system differ from those stipulated in the tax laws.
This separation of accounting and tax rules gives managers some leeway to
manipulate book income and taxable income separately, and inevitably results in
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large book tax differences. Managers can make income-increasing/decreasing
accounting changes through bad debt provisions, depreciation estimates, and other
discretionary accruals. For example, Chen et al. (2000) find that listed Chinese
companies use discretionary accruals to manage earnings to a level required for
maintaining listing status and raising additional capital through rights issue.
Furthermore, book tax separation produces flexibility not only for financial reporting,
but also for tax reporting, because there are more adjusting items in the tax returns
which can be employed by managers to manipulate taxable income. As a result, it is
possible that managers can manipulate book income and taxable income in a
nonconforming way. That is, managers can choose one treatment for tax reporting
and another one for financial accounting reporting. For example, when the straightline depreciation method is required for tax reporting and minimum useful life of the
asset is stipulated in the tax regulation, managers can adopt other depreciation
methods, such as double-declining balance method and sum-of-the-years-digits
method for financial reporting, and determine expected useful life based on the
specific situation. Another example is that managers can choose difference inventory
methods for accounting and tax purposes. Thus, book income and taxable income
differ in such contexts.
However, tax and non-tax costs tradeoff theory implies that managers cannot
costlessly overstate accounting income and understate taxable income independently.
This tradeoff theory suggests that rational corporate managers should attempt to
maximize the expected utility of known current tax payments, probable future extra
tax costs, and other non-tax costs such as financial reporting costs.7 In the simplest
situation, that is, without probable extra tax costs and other non-tax costs, corporate
7

As pointed out by Mills and Newberry (2001), some firms that face significant non-tax financial
reporting costs still report small book-tax differences. Such irrational behavior is difficult to predict
and test empirically.
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managers have the incentive to report as low taxable income as possible, even zero
taxable income, to minimize tax payments, and to report as high book income as
possible to maximize financial reporting benefits. In a realistic complex situation, a
firm faces two kinds of costs. The first one is the probable extra tax costs, such as tax
examination costs and tax fines. On one hand, when taxable income is held constant,
increasing book income will result in larger book tax differences. However, as both
book income and taxable income are based on the same underlying economic
transactions, increasing book income will in many cases increase taxable income. In
other words, if book income is increased while taxable income is not, tax
noncompliant behavior is probably committed. It is known that an increase in book
income will normally lead to an increase in taxable income as well, even when
accounting and tax regulations are separated. That is, if book income is overstated
accompanying larger book tax differences, tax authorities may suspect that tax
noncompliance exists, and thus additional tax related costs are likely to be incurred.
On the other hand, when the accounting income remains unchanged, reducing
taxable income can also lead to larger book tax differences. Prior literature (Cloyd et
al., 1996; Mills, 1996, 1998; Mills and Sansing, 2001) suggests that book tax
differences attract the attention of the tax authorities, increase the possibility of tax
examination, and thus incur extra tax costs. Cloyd et al. (1996) find that book-tax
conformity decreases the probability of the IRS’ audit and scrutiny. Mills (1996)
finds that tax audit adjustments by the IRS increase as conformity between
accounting for financial reporting and tax reporting decreases, and argues that
reporting higher book income relative to taxable income may incur additional tax
costs relating to probable tax examination. Mills also examines the relationship
between the level of book tax conformity and the variation in managers’ incentives
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for book income reporting versus tax savings, and finds preliminary evidence that
book income is closer to taxable income when tax incentives are more important than
financial reporting incentives. Mills (1998) and Mills and Sansing (2000) conclude
that book tax differences can be seen as a signal of aggressive tax reporting behavior,
and book tax differences increase tax examination costs whenever the differences
originate from understating taxable income or overstating accounting income.
The other type of cost a firm faces, when reporting lower book income, is the
non-tax financial reporting costs. In order to alleviate the scrutiny of tax authorities
due to large book tax difference arising from understatement of taxable income,
corporate managers may report lower book income to narrow the gap. However,
reporting conformity would incur financial reporting costs, because firm contracts
are usually connected with, or based on, accounting income. For example, managers’
compensation plans are often tied to the level of accounting income. Lower book
income impairs their annual bonuses and personnel actions. Another example of an
accounting-based contract is debt covenant, because book income has a great
influence on a company’s future potential power of obtaining loans from banks. In
addition, lowering book income negatively affects a firm’s market value and
corporate reputation.
Therefore, additional tax-related costs may be incurred when companies
report large book tax differences. According to the Scholes-Wolfson conceptual
framework, managers need to consider all taxes and all costs to choose the best book
and tax reporting strategies with the highest expected utility. As such, there can be a
close relationship between book tax differences and tax noncompliance, consistent
with Mills (1998).
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4.3 Research Hypothesis
Tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs are not the same before and after substantial
book tax separation. When financial accounting and tax rules were in alignment
before 2001, the tax and non-tax tradeoff was simple, as book income and tax
income varied in the same direction and with similar magnitude. In this context,
managers traded off the relative importance of book income against taxable income,
i.e., traded off the financial reporting benefits against tax savings. Specifically, if tax
incentive outweighs book incentive, firms would report lower taxable income and
correspondingly lower book income. Contrarily, if book incentive outweighs tax
incentive, firms would report higher book income and pay higher tax as well. There
were few additional tax costs in this situation, and these costs were irrelevant in the
tradeoff consideration.
When accounting and tax rules became detached after 2000, thus creating an
opportunity for firms to manipulate both book income and taxable income separately,
firms had to consider extra costs of tax examination and tax fines, which firms did
not have to consider before book tax separation. More specifically, when tax
incentive outweighs book incentive, firms may report lower taxable income without
affecting book income. In China, taxable income is calculated based on book income
and through a number of tax deductions. Book tax separation increases the
complexity of reconciliation between book income and taxable income. Firms may
have more opportunities and flexibility to minimize taxable income with less of an
effect on book income. For example, a firm may record bad debt provisions (a
partially deductible adjusting item) exceeding 0.5% of accounts receivable year-end
balances for financial accounting reporting purposes. When calculating taxable
income that uses book income as a starting point in the tax returns, the firm may
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intentionally not add back the proportion of bad debt provisions that exceeds the
limit allowable by the tax rules. As a result, taxable income determined is smaller
than the correct one based on tax rules, and the resultant book tax difference becomes
larger. 8 Another example is the tax deductible adjusting item – profits obtained from
affiliate companies. Firms may intentionally exclude these profits more than the
actual amount obtained. As such, taxable income is decreased with book income
unaffected, and book tax differences become larger.9 Similar cases can be found for
all other book tax differential items, including both tax deductible and nondeductible adjusting items, such as seven free-choice provisions, income for previous
loss making-up and so on. 10 When book incentive outweighs tax incentive, some
firms may be able to report higher book income with little impact on taxable income.
In fact, it is even more likely for firms to overstate book income and understate

8

I assume the following numerical example. Suppose the book income before considering bad debt
provisions is $10,000,000, and taxable income before considering these provisions is $8,000,000 (i.e.,
assume that this amount is obtained by starting from the book income and subjected to a number of
adjusting items). Also assume that the firm, based on its specific situation, records bad debt provisions
at an average 10% of accounts receivable ending balances of $5,000,000 for financial reporting. Based
on these numbers, the book income after considering the bad debt provisions should be $9,500,000
($10,000,000 - $5,000,000 * 10%). As the stipulated percentage of bad debt provision by tax rules is
0.5% of ending balances of accounts receivable, the correct amount of bad debt provision that ought to
be added back to the taxable income should be $475,000 ($5,000,000 * (10% - 0.5%)), and thus the
correct amount of taxable income should be $8,475,000 ($8,000,000 + $475,000). Therefore, book tax
differences absent of tax avoidance should be $1,025,000 ($9,500,000 - $8,475,000). When the firm
intends to reduce taxable income by not adding back the amounts of $475,000, book tax differences
will become $1,500,000 ($9,500,000 - $8,000,000). As a result, book tax differences increase by
$475,000 ($1,500,000 - $ 1,025,000), originating from an intentionally understatement of taxable
income while book income is not affected.
9

Suppose the book income and taxable income before considering profits obtained from affiliate
companies are $10,000,000 and $8,000,000, respectively. Also assume that the amount of profits
obtained from affiliate companies is $100,000, which is fully tax deductible. Further assume that the
firm intentionally deducts $110,000 (i.e. $10,000 more than the actual amount) for tax reporting.
Based on these numbers, the book income after considering profits obtained from affiliate companies
should be $10,100,000 ($10,000,000+$100,000). The correct amount of taxable income should be
$7,900,000 ($8,000,000-$100,000), while the incorrect amount due to over-deduction should be
$7,890,000 ($8,000,000-$110,000). As a result, the correct book tax difference is $2,200,000
($10,100,000-$7,900,000), while the incorrect one is $2,210,000 ($10,100,000-$7,890,000). Therefore,
book tax differences would increase by $10,000 ($2,210,000-$2,200,000), as taxable income is
decreased by the same amount while book income is not affected.
10

For more adjusting items, see Table 1.
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taxable income simultaneously to obtain both financial reporting and tax benefits.11
All these cases indicate that both tax deductible and non-deductible adjusting
items are likely to attract the tax authorities’ attention when book tax difference
arises, and firms may incur tax-related costs as a result. Tax authorities may suspect
that there could be something wrong when a firm reports large book tax difference,
and therefore would regard book tax difference as a red flag of tax noncompliance
behavior.
In this way, the major distinction of tax and non-tax tradeoffs before and after
book tax separation is that additional tax-related costs have a greater impact on the
tradeoff between tax incentives and financial reporting incentives after separation
than before. In addition, there may be more incentives for tax planning after book tax
separation than before. These differential incentives for tax planning are ascribed to

11

Continue with the above numerical example of bad debt provision. It is also very likely that firms
can intentionally record less bad provision for financial reporting (e.g., only 8% instead of 10%) to
overstate book income, while taxable income is still reduced. Suppose the taxable income before bad
debt provisions are considered becomes $8,100,000. (This assumption is reasonable, because taxable
income should be increased accordingly when book income is overstated.) The new book income
would be $9,600,000 ($10,000,000 - $5,000,000 * 8%), an overstatement of $100,000 from the
previous one ($9,600,000 - $9,500,000. The correct amount of taxable income should be $8,475,000
($8,100,000 + $5,000,000 * (8% - 0.5%). While the book tax difference absent of tax avoidance and
earnings management is $1,025,000 ($9,600,000 - $8,475,000), book tax differences in the presence
of tax avoidance and earnings management become $1,500,000 ($9,500,000 - $8,100,000). As a result,
book tax differences increase by $475,000 ($1,500,000 - $1,025,000). In other words, book income is
overstated by $100,000 and taxable income is understated simultaneously by $375,000 ($8,475,000 $8,100,000).
The much more sophisticated examples can be found in the Report of Investigation of Enron
Corporation and Related Entities Regarding Federal Tax and Compensation Issues, and Policy
Recommendations by Joint Committee on Taxation in the US in 2003. Enron deliberately structured
complicated transactions to obtain financial reporting and tax benefits, by utilizing the various
differential items of book and tax treatments. This report discusses 12 typical structured transactions
from 1995 through 2001 when Enron was filed for bankruptcy. For example, Project Tanya, Project
Valor, Project Steele, and Project Cochise that were designed to duplicate tax losses (i.e., deduct the
same tax loss twice) generated significant accounting income; Project Thomas, Project Condor, and
Project Teresa that were designed to shift tax basis from a non-depreciable asset to a depreciable asset
also produce financial reporting benefits.
For more details, see “Joint Committee on Taxation, Written Testimony of the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation on the Report of Investigation of Enron Corporation and Related Entities
Regarding Federal Tax and Compensation Issues, and Policy Recommendations (JCX-10-03),
February 13, 2003” and “Joint Committee on Taxation, Report of Investigation of Enron Corporation
and Related Entities Regarding Federal Tax and Compensation Issues, and Policy Recommendations
(JCS-3-03), February 2003”.

30

the fact that there is more room for manipulating book income and taxable income
separately and more additional tax costs to consider after separation.
According to the above discussion, book tax separation since 2001 may have
led to large book tax differences and created more room for Chinese managers to
manipulate accounting and tax income in a nonconforming manner. However,
managers cannot costlessly maximize both financial reporting benefits and tax
savings at the same time (Mills, 1998). Firms maximizing financial reporting benefits
or minimizing current tax liabilities face probable costs of tax examination and
sanctions. The tradeoff a firm makes between (1) current tax savings, (2) financial
reporting benefits, and (3) costs of the examinations and fines may give rise to book
tax differences. As book tax differences represent the possibility of aggressive tax
planning (Mills, 1998), I hypothesize that:
All else being equal, the magnitude of tax noncompliance for Chinese listed
companies will be greater as book tax differences increase, especially after book tax
separation in 2001.12

12

Similar to other studies, this hypothesis assumes a low level of ethics amongst management in
preparing accounts and tax returns. Quite a number of studies have documented the relationship
between business ethics and tax compliance behavior. A thorough discussion would be beyond the
scope of this study with the focus on the relationship between book tax difference and tax
noncompliance behavior. For more details on business ethics and income tax, see relevant literature
including Schwartz and Orleans (1967), Hunt and Vitell (1986), Jackson and Milliron (1986), Roth et
al. (1989), Hite (1996), and Henderson and Kaplan (2005).
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Chapter 5
Research Design

This chapter describes data collection and sample selection, and develops a
multiple regression model for empirical testing of hypothesis with regard to the
relationship between book tax difference and tax noncompliance in China.

5.1 Data collection and sample selection
Since this study intends to investigate the effect of book tax differences
which have originated from the separation of accounting and tax regulations on tax
noncompliance behavior of listed Chinese companies, most data for the purpose of
empirical testing are collected from annual reports of companies listed on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the period 1998-2003. 13 While book
income, ownership structure, and other control variables are publicly available from
financial statements, notes and announcements of the companies, taxable income and
tax audit adjustments are obtained from local tax authorities and CPA firms.14

13

There are two major reasons why I choose data beginning from 1998. One reason is that it is
difficult to find the hypothesized relationship as book tax differences are relatively small before 1998.
The other reason is that partial delinking of book tax reporting taking place in 1998 provides an equal
basis for analysis across the years.

14

Some researchers argue that the use of unpublicized data, such as tax audit adjustments, may give
rise to significant methodology issues, because it will be difficult for other researchers to replicate the
study, and thus impair the validity and reliability of empirical results and conclusions. However,
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) argue that research using unpublicized data should be encouraged for
several reasons. One reason is that such studies can also be replicated, because other researchers can
access the same unpublicized data using different methods. In addition, in some sense, collecting
unpublicized data is similar to collecting costly and private data, such as data collection in field
research, experimental economics and so on. Another reason is that conclusions and theories obtained
from unpublicized data can be tested and proved, although imperfectly, by studies using publicized
data. Triangulation is possible to reexamine the conclusions, and thus enhance the validity and
reliability.
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The full sample consists of 3,000 firm-years during 1998-2003, that is, 500
companies per year. As the total number of A-share companies is 825 in 1998, I
randomly select 500 of them (264 in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 236 in the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange), and obtain data for the 500 A-share companies during
the studied period. As there are missing values for some observations, 159 firm-years
are excluded.15 Then I exclude 30 firm-years of financial institutions, because book
tax separation in 2001 may not have any impact on financial institutions.16 To reduce
noise and avoid the need to control for the effect of some variables on audit
adjustments, I exclude 126 firm-years with zero or negative tax audit adjustments
(i.e., taxable incomes filed by listed companies are larger than, or equal to, audited
taxable incomes by tax authorities). I further exclude 466 firm-years with zero or
negative book tax differences (i.e., taxable incomes are larger than, or equal to, pretax accounting incomes in the annual financial reports), because the magnitude of tax
audit adjustments may not be associated with negative book tax differences (Mills,
1998).17 I also exclude 12 firm-years with standardized residuals larger than 3 as

15

As the sample companies are selected by random, the problem of sample selection bias should not
exist. However, self-selection bias may exist because of tax authorities’ choice of tax audit subjects
(Mills, 1998). In China, not all listed companies are audited by the tax authorities each year due to a
lack of resources. Thus, self-selection error may arise in the regression analysis. The probability of
being audited by tax authorities may be associated with some firm characteristics, such as size,
ownership structure, and financial status. Due to the difficulty of collecting unpublicized data, whether
those companies excluded from the sample are audited or not cannot be determined, that is, the
probability of being tax audited is unknown. Thus, possible self-selection bias cannot be corrected in
this study. Future studies may be needed to solve the problem by accessing more unpublicized data.
16

The new Accounting system for Business Enterprises and some other accounting standards are not
applicable to financial institutions, such as banks and security companies. Instead, they should follow
the Accounting System for Financial Institutions effective on January 1, 2002.

17

In the sensitivity tests, the hypothesized relationship is examined for the sample consisting of zero
and negative tax audit adjustments and book tax differences. In addition, another sensitivity test is
performed to reexamine the main results when observations with zero and negative tax audit
adjustments and book tax differences are included in the main sample. Zero and negative observations
are treated as tax compliant, and transformed into one for regression analysis.
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outliers for the purpose of regression tests. 18 Hence, the final sample consists of
2,207 firm-year observations.

5.2 Regression Model
Both univariate and multivariate analysis are used to examine the association
between tax audit adjustments and book tax differences pre- and post-delinking of
tax accounting from financial accounting. I first use independent sample t-test to
compare the mean tax audit adjustments and book tax differences in terms of preand post-200019. I also use the Kruskal-Wallis Test and median tests to compare the
median tax audit adjustments and book tax differences for the two periods. Then I
calculate the simple correlation for the final sample to preliminarily examine the
extent to which book tax differences are correlated with tax audit adjustments, and to
check for the existence of any multicollinearity problem.
To test the hypothesis, I establish the following multiple regression model.

Ln(TAXADJ) =a0+a1BT+a2POST00+a3POST00*BT+a4OWNER
+a5STRESS+a6AGE+a7SIZE+aiINDUSTRYi+ei

where:
Dependent variable:
Ln(TAXADJ) = natural logarithm of tax audit adjustments divided by sales
revenue.
Explanatory variables:
BT
= pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by
sales revenue.
POST00
= 1, if tax audit adjustments are made for the fiscal years
subsequent to 2000, zero otherwise.
18

Outliers need to be eliminated, as the presence of outliers will adversely affect the fitted values of
the regression model, and may give rise to the problem of heteroscedasticity, which can cause
difficulties of hypothesis testing due to inefficient estimators, and bring about misleading results.
19
“Pre-2000” and “prior to 2000” include the year 2000, and “post-2000” and “subsequent to 2000”
do not include the year 2000.
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Control variables:
OWNER
= 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of
institutional shares, zero otherwise.
STRESS
= 1, if the company issues new stock in the next two years, zero
otherwise.
AGE
= number of years since the company’s initial public offering.
SIZE
= natural logarithm of year-end total assets.
INDUSTRYi = dummy variables representing 13 sub-industries.
The dependent variable is measured as the magnitude of tax audit adjustments
scaled by sales revenue, subject to a natural logarithm transformation. The natural
logarithm always makes sense, since companies with zero or negative tax audit
adjustments are excluded from the sample, and tax audit adjustments and sales
revenue are positive all the time in this context
Three explanatory variables are included in the regression model. BT,
representing book tax differences, is equal to pre-tax accounting income less taxable
income, scaled by sales revenue. The expected coefficient of this variable will be
positive, because I predict that tax audit adjustments will be greater as book tax
differences increase. POST00 is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if tax audit
adjustments occurred after 2000, and equals 0 otherwise. If tax audit adjustments are
greater after the separation of accounting and tax regulations in 2001, the coefficient
of POST00 will be positive. The interaction term POST00*BT tests the hypothesis
that book-tax differences subsequent to 2000 result in greater tax audit adjustments
than those prior to 2000. A positive coefficient on this interaction term suggests that
book tax differences are more predictive of tax aggressiveness subsequent to 2000.
Five audit adjustment related variables are included as control variables. Prior
literature suggests that ownership type (public and private) has an impact on book tax
differences and tax noncompliance behavior (Cloyd et al., 1996; Mills, 1996, 1998;
Mills and Newberry, 2001). Cloyd et al. (1996) argue that public firms are less
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aggressive in tax noncompliance than private firms, because public firms face more
significant financial reporting costs originating from capital market pressure and
agency problems. Mills (1996) and Mills and Newberry (2001) find that public firms
have a larger book tax difference than private firms, because public firms face more
non-tax costs, and have fewer incentives for book tax conformity. Mills (1998)
suggests that public firms have less tax audit adjustments than private firms, as
higher financial reporting costs restrict public firms from engaging in tax
noncompliance activities. As I examine the tax noncompliance behavior of publicly
traded firms in this study, ownership structure may be more applicable here than
ownership type. In China’s capital market, stock shares of listed companies consist
of state shares, institutional shares, and individual shares. In the early years, most
listed companies’ stocks are dominated by state shares. State shares have recently
been gradually decreasing. Thus, control of ownership structure is applicable in this
context. In the regression model, the dummy variable OWNER, as a measure of
ownership structure, equals 1 if the percentage of state ownership of a company is
greater than that of institutional shares, and equals 0 otherwise. In other words,
OWNER=1 represents the state-dominated or government-controlled companies. In
China, the tax incentives of state-dominated versus other companies are different. As
managers of state-dominated companies regard tax payment submitted to the
government as a symbol of prestige and success, they may have little incentive to
intentionally report lower taxable income and to engage in tax noncompliance
behavior. Therefore, I expect the coefficient of this variable to be negative.
As prior studies suggest that financial stress is associated with book tax
differences and tax noncomplicance (Bradley, 1994; Mills and Newberry, 2001), the
dummy variable STRESS is included in the regression. STRESS equals 1 if the
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company issues new stock in the next two years, and equals 0 otherwise.20 In China,
there are relevant regulations on stock rights issue, which create pressures on listed
companies to meet a target profitability level. In order to satisfy the requirements,
listed companies may attempt to mitigate the financial stress by manipulating
earnings and tax payments. That is, if a company intends to raise additional capital
through rights issue, it is likely that the company may manipulate both earnings and
tax liabilities to present a healthy cash flow in their annual financial statements
(Chen et al., 2000). As such, the coefficient is expected to be positive.
The variable AGE represents firm age, that is, the number of years since a
company’s initial public offering (IPO). Based on the US data, Murray (1995) finds
that older companies are less compliant with sales tax regulations than newer
companies, but this conclusion does not involve income tax noncompliance. Based
on China, DeFond et al. (2001) argue that as firms are getting older, they are more
likely to have exhausted capital raised in the IPOs. Thus, they may be aggressive in
tax planning in order to improve their cash flows. However, it is also possible that
the longer a firm is listed, the more mature and established it becomes in the industry,
and hence the less likely the firm will engage in tax avoidance activities. Therefore, I
do not predict the sign of the coefficient.
The control variable SIZE is measured as total assets subject to a natural
logarithm transformation. Rice (1992) finds that firm size has a positive association
with tax noncompliance. On the contrary, Mills (1998) argues that as large firms may
have more resources for tax planning, it will be difficult for tax authorities to detect
20

One of the requirements for stock rights issue in China prior to March 1999 was that the return on
equity (ROE) of each year was no less than 10% for the past three consecutive years. In March 1999,
the China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated a new regulation which specified that a
company was qualified for stock rights issue if (a) the average ROE for the past three years was no
less than 10% and (b) the ROE of each year in the past three years was no less than 6%. In March
2001, the requirement was modified again. From then on, the qualification concerning ROE for stock
rights issue is that the average ROE (lowering of ROE with exclusion and inclusion of extraordinary
items) for the past three years is no less than 6%.
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their noncompliance behavior. On the other hand, as large firms are more visible to
the public and tax authorities, they have less incentive to undertake tax
noncompliance. As such, I do not make any prediction on the sign of this variable.
Finally, the dummy variable INDUSTRYi controls for firm fixed effects in
the pooled regression. The coding of INDUSTRYi is based on the industry
classification proposed by the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. There are
thirteen industries in this classification, and the industry of financial institutions is
excluded as mentioned before.
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Chapter 6
Empirical Results

This chapter presents data analysis results for hypothesis testing, including
descriptive statistics, univariate tests of mean comparison (independent samples t-test)
and median comparison (Kruskal-Wallis Test and Median Tests), simple correlation
matrix, and multiple regression test. The results of various sensitivity tests are also
reported in this chapter.

6.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 lists the major items resulting in book tax differences for 2,207 firmyear observations. For tax non-deductible adjusting items, bad debt provision, seven
free-choice allowances, and capital expenditure, average 42.23%, 36.23%, and
8.16% of total tax non-deductible adjustments over the study period, respectively.21
For tax deductible adjusting items, profits obtained from affiliate companies, income
for previous loss making-up, and interest revenue of treasury bond, take up 40.44%,
26.90%, and 7.33%, on average, of total tax deductible adjustments, respectively.
These differential items, due to the divergence of accounting and tax regulations,
produce book tax differences, which constitute the necessary background of this
empirical study.
[Table 1]

21

The seven free-choice allowances significantly decrease in 2002 and 2003. The possible reason is
that after firms record more seven free-choice allowances than the amount they should be, the
overstated portion may have been released in the subsequent years.
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Table 2 presents descriptive statistics by year for the variables used in the
empirical tests. Tax audit adjustments average 0.51% of sales revenue, and fluctuate
slightly between 0.46% and 0.63% of sales revenue over the study period. Book tax
difference is about 17.25% of sales revenue, and it increases gradually in the period
1998-2000, but sharply in the period 2001-2003, indicating that book tax separation
did lead to larger book tax differences subsequent to 2000. The medians of TAXADJ
and BT (0.22% and 6.29% respectively) are much lower than their means, suggesting
that the observations with larger tax audit adjustment and book tax difference deviate
from the means much more than those with smaller tax audit adjustment and book
tax difference. The standard deviations of TAXADJ and BT are 0.0098 and 0.5347,
which appear to be large enough for statistical analysis.
For the 2,207 firm-year observations, about 59% of firm-years are statedominated, and 47% face financial stress. The mean number of years since IPO is
6.05, and the average firm size is RMB 187 million.
[Table 2]

6.2 Univariate and bivariate tests
The sample period is divided into two for the empirical tests. Period I (predelinking period) refers to the years 1998-2000, and period II (post-delinking period)
refers to the years 2001-2003. Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics by period and
the results of univariate comparison of mean, median, and variance between the two
periods. The mean adjustment scaled by sales revenue for period II is greater than
period I (0.54% vs. 0.49%), but they are not significantly different. As expected, the
mean book tax difference scaled by sales revenue for period II is significantly larger
than period I (23.39% vs. 12.55%), at the 0.01 significance level. These statistics
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provide suggestive evidence that separation of accounting and tax regulations in
2001 did lead to a larger book tax difference and tax audit adjustment. The results of
Levene’s tests for equality of variance indicate that TAXADJ and BT significantly
vary much more in period II than in period I. This may lead to the problem of
heteroscedesticity in the regression analysis (Gujarati, 2003). Thus, TAXADJ is
subjected to the natural logarithm in the regression model to mitigate the problem.
[Table 3]
Table 4 presents Pearson correlations amongst the variables used in the study.
With respect to correlations between TAXADJ and the other variables, except the
negative correlation between TAXADJ and STRESS, the directions of pairwise
correlations are generally in accordance with previous predictions. Specifically,
TAXADJ is significantly correlated with the interaction term POST00*BT (r=0.314,
p=0.000), preliminarily supporting the hypothesis that book tax difference is more
indicative of tax noncompliance after 2001 than before 2001. However, since the
simple correlations do not control for other effects, evidence from the correlation
matrix is not affirmatory.
All correlations between independent variables are below 0.30, except
correlations between BT and POST00*BT (0.924), between STRESS and POST00 (0.375), between AGE and POST00 (0.597), and between STRESS and AGE (-0.312).
As BT and the interaction term POST00*BT have an approximate linear relationship,
a serious multicollinearity problem may exist. Although the ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimators are still BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimators) in the regression
model, their standard errors are higher, making the t-statistics lower and p-value
higher. This makes it difficult to interpret individual coefficients. To correct for the
problem of multicollinearity, BT is subject to Z-standardization by year (Kim, 1999;
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Fischer, 2004).22 The major advantage of the standardization transformation of BT is
that the multicollinearity problem between BT and POST00*BT can be removed or
dramatically reduced by standardization, without losing information in the original
regression model (Kim, 1999).
[Table 4]

6.3 Multivariate test
Table 5 presents the results of pooled regression of tax audit adjustment on
book tax difference for the 2,207 firm-year observations. The explanatory variable
BT is positively related to tax audit adjustment, although it is not significant
(a1=0.030, t=1.265, p=0.206). This insignificance may be due to a weak relationship
between tax noncompliance and book tax difference prior to book tax separation in
2001. The coefficient of POST00 is significant at 0.01 (a2=0.062, t=2.723, p=0.007),
suggesting that the magnitude of tax audit adjustments before 2000 significantly
differ from the magnitude after 2000. The interaction term POST00*BT has a
significantly positive relationship with tax audit adjustments (a3=0.100, t=4.220,
p=0.000). These results support the hypothesis that the magnitude of tax
noncompliance is more closely related to book tax difference after compared to
before the separation of accounting and tax regulations in 2001. I estimate that when
compared with pre-2000, tax audit adjustment in post-2000 will be (on average)

22

Based on Kim (1999) and Fischer (2004), BT is subjected to Z-standardization transformation as
follows.
Standardized BTt = (BTt - Mean (BTt) ) / Standard Deviation (BTt)
Standardized POST00* BTt = POST00 * Standardized BTt
(t=1998,…,2003)
The resulting means and standard deviations of BTt in each year is zero and one respectively.
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greater by 0.05% of sales revenue as book tax difference increases by one
standardized unit.23
[Table 5]
The results of control variables are mixed. The signs of the coefficients of
OWNER and STRESS are contrary to prior expectation, but they are not significant.
The coefficient of the variable AGE is negative and significant, suggesting that tax
audit adjustments are smaller for older companies, possibly because once firms have
become more established, they are less inclined to enter into tax shelter activities.
The variable SIZE is negatively related to tax audit adjustment at the 0.01 level,
consistent with Mills’ (1998) discussion that large firms are more capable of tax
planning, and therefore tax authorities face more challenges in detecting their tax
noncompliance behaviors.

23

Suppose there is the regression Ln(Y ) = α 0 + α 1 × X + ε . We can interpret α1 as follows.

dY / Y
dY
⇒
= α1 × Y
dX
dX
Therefore, as X increases by one unit, Y increases by α 1 × Y units on average.

α1 =

In the pooled regression of tax audit adjustment on book tax difference (control variables are included
in ε ),

Ln(TAXADJ ) = α 0 + α 1 × BT + α 2 × POST 00 + α 3 × ( POST 00 × BT ) + ε
when POST00=0, Ln(TAXADJ ) = α 0 + α 1 × BT + ε .
When POST00=1, Ln(TAXADJ ) = (α 0 + α 2 ) + (α 1 + α 3 ) × BT + ε .

Hence, the results can be interpreted as follows. When POST00=0, as BT increases by one
standardized unit, TAXADJ increases by

α 1 × (TAXADJ ) 0

(i.e., 0.030*0.0049=0.000147),

where (TAXADJ ) 0 represents the mean of TAXADJ for pre-2000 observations. When POST00=1,
as BT increases by one standardized unit, TAXADJ increases by

(α 1 + α 3 ) × (TAXADJ )1 (i.e., (0.030+0.100)*0.0054=0.000702),
where (TAXADJ )1 represents the mean of TAXADJ for post-2000 observations. Moreover, as BT
increases by one standardized unit, there is, on average,

[(α 1 + α 3 ) × (TAXADJ )1 − α 1 × (TAXADJ ) 0 ]
(i.e. (0.030+0.100)*0.0054-0.030*0.0049=0.000555)
more units increase in TAXADJ after 2000 than before.
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The overall model fit of this pooled regression is reasonably good (Adjusted
R-square=0.318; F=61.597; p-value=0.000), and has enough explanatory power to
test the hypothesis on the relationship between tax noncompliance and book tax
difference. All variance inflation factor values of independent variables are less than
one, indicating that no serious multicollinearity problem exists in the regression
model after BT is subjected to Z-standardization transformation. To check the
problem of heteroscedasticity, the scatter graph is plotted with estimated squared
residual as the y-axis and estimated dependent variable as the x-axis. No systematic
pattern is identified, indicating no serious heteroscedasticity in the regression model.
Also, White’s test is performed, and the null hypothesis that homoscedasticity
prevails is not rejected at 0.01. Therefore, the regression results are reliable and
credible.

6.4 Sensitivity tests
To check the robustness of the regression results, several additional
regression tests are conducted. Table 6 presents the results of these sensitivity tests.
First, annual regressions are performed to examine the yearly relationships
between book tax difference and tax audit adjustment. 24 For the three annual
regressions prior to 2000, the coefficients of BT are all positive but insignificant,
while for the three annual regressions subsequent to 2000, the coefficients of BT are
all positive and significant at 0.01. Regressions by the two periods (pre-2000 and
post-2000) are also performed. For the pre-delinking period, BT is insignificantly
positively related to TAXADJ (a1=0.040, t=1.571, p=0.116). For the post-delinking

24

Mills (1998) argues that an alternative to the pooled regression with fixed effects is annual
regressions, which eliminates potential understated standard errors and removes the yearly
measurement error to some extent.
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period, BT has a significantly positive relationship with TAXADJ (a1=0.156, t=5.796,
p=0.000). These additional analyses provide reinforcing evidence to support the
hypothesis.
Second, tax audit adjustment and book tax difference are scaled by total
assets, instead of sales revenue, to validate the empirical results. Compared with the
previous empirical results, the coefficient of BT becomes negative but is still
insignificant, and the coefficient of POST00 is positive and insignificant. The
coefficient of the interaction term POST00*BT is positive and significant (a3=0.290,
t=4.615, p=0.000), consistent with the main results. As for the control variables, the
coefficient of STRESS becomes positive and significant (a5=0.076, t=3.531,
p=0.000). Although it is different from the previous pooled regression results, the
result is consistent with the literature and the prior prediction that the financial stress
rooted in the motivation of stock rights issue puts pressure on the listed companies in
China, and has an influence on their tax noncompliance behavior. However, the
contradictory results are not conclusive. In addition, the coefficient of AGE becomes
insignificant, which fails to validate the result in the previous regression that age has
significant impacts on tax audit adjustment.
Third, I examined the sample consisting of zero and negative tax audit
adjustments and book tax differences. Tax audit adjustment and book tax difference
are scaled by sales revenue (not subject to natural logarithm transformation) and total
assets in two separate regression equations. No relationships are found, and all
explanatory variables and control variables are insignificant at 0.05. The results are
similar to Mills’ (1998) study, in which she asserts that the insignificant relationship
should not be surprising, and it cannot be concluded temporarily whether managers
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can manipulate book income and taxable income without cost when book tax
differences are negative.
Finally, observations with zero and negative tax audit adjustments and book
tax differences are added back into the main sample, with zero and negative tax audit
adjustments transformed into one unit of local currency. The hypothesis is not clearly
supported, as the coefficients of BT and POST00*BT in the two regressions, with tax
audit adjustments and book tax differences scaled by sales revenue and total assets,
respectively, are not consistent. OWNER is significant in the regression of Panel D1
at 0.05, but becomes insignificant in the regression of Panel D2, and thus the
influence of ownership structure is not conclusive. SIZE is significant in both
regressions, which is consistent with the main results.
[Table 6]
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Limitations

This chapter summarizes main results of this empirical study, and discusses
several limitations and possible areas for future research.

7.1 Conclusions
Most tax noncompliance research has been conducted based on data from the
US and other developed countries. Studies on tax noncompliance in developing
countries are limited. China’s substantial separation of accounting and tax
regulations in the late 1990s, especially in 2001, offers an opportunity to examine
Mills’ (1998) findings on the relationship between book tax difference and tax
noncompliance in the transitional economy framework. Due to China’s specific
context, the relationship studied here is different from that of Mills. In China, tax and
non-tax cost tradeoffs before and after book tax separation are not the same, as
additional tax-related costs have to be considered by managers to achieve
maximization of expected financial and tax benefits. In addition, companies have
differential incentives of tax planning in the two periods, because there is different
room for managers to manipulate book income and taxable income freely. Based on
the tax and non-tax cost tradeoff, I hypothesize that the magnitude of tax
noncompliance increases as the book tax difference increases, especially after the
book tax separation in 2001.
The sample for the study comprises the companies listed on the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges during the period 1998-2003, with 2,207 firm-year
observations. Publicized data are collected from annual financial reports, notes,
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announcements, and other documents, while unpublicized data are obtained from
local tax authorities and CPA firms. Univariate and multivariate methods are
performed to test the hypothesis, including independent sample t-test, Kruskal-Wallis
test and median test, Pearson correlations, and multiple regression analysis. The
empirical results suggest that book tax difference arising from the separation of book
tax rules is positively related to tax audit adjustment, and that the relationship is more
significant subsequent to 2000 than before, consistent with the hypothesis stated in
the study. After book tax separation, book tax difference becomes more informative
about tax aggressiveness in China. The results imply that although it is necessary for
financial accounting regulations and tax rules to separate, policy makers, when
setting financial accounting standards, should consider not only the true and fair view
of financial accounting on the capital market, but also the impact of tax
noncompliance behavior on government revenue. There should be an optimal level
of divergence of accounting and tax rules, where truthfulness and fairness of
financial accounting are best attained, and at the same time the magnitude of tax
noncompliance is minimized.

7.2 Limitations and suggestions for future studies
There are several potential limitations in this empirical analysis. First, no
statistically significant relationship between negative book tax difference and tax
audit adjustment is found. This is possibly because the regression model is not
powerful enough to test the relation, which should be investigated by further studies.
Further research may try devising a proper model to test whether negative book tax
difference is correlated with negative tax audit adjustment, complementing the
results of this study. Second, prior literature suggests that tax noncompliance can be
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decomposed into book tax conforming noncompliance and book tax difference
noncompliance (Chan and Mo, 2002). Nevertheless, the decomposition is
constrained by data availability. Future research on this area should be warranted.
Third, it is premature to conclude whether financial stress and firm age have impacts
on tax noncompliance, as the empirical results are mixed when tax audit adjustment
and book tax difference are scaled by sales revenue and total assets in two separate
regressions. Future studies may focus on the effects of these two factors on tax
noncompliance behavior. Fourth, self-selection bias may arise because firm
characteristics and other factors may influence tax authorities’ choice of tax audit
targets. The existence of the problem may result in misleading conclusions. However,
self-selection bias cannot be corrected in this study due to a lack of relevant data.
Future research may be needed to take the self-selection problem into analysis by
accessing more relevant unpublicized data. Finally, studies on tax noncompliance
behavior based on data from other developing countries are needed to strengthen and
triangulate the results of this study, and to provide more reference for other
economies experiencing a similar transition of tax-based accounting to international
accounting standards.
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Table 1

Sources of Book Tax Difference

Sources of Book Tax Difference
Tax Non-deductible Adjusting Items (%)
Bad Debt Provisions
Seven Free-Choice Allowances
Capital Expenditure
Salary Expenses
Business Reception Expenses
Sponsoring Expenditure
Donations for Commonweal and Relief Purpose
Donations Not for Commonweal and Relief Purpose
Expenditure Not Related to Sales
Miscellaneous Items
Total
Tax Deductible Adjusting Items (%)
Profits Obtained from Affiliate Companies
Income for Previous Loss Making-up
Interest Revenue of Treasury Bond
Dividends Obtained
Technology Transferring Proceeds
Foreign Income
Profits from “Three Wastes” Harnessing
Miscellaneous Items
Total

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Total

18.97% 55.18% 30.36% 16.14% 72.46% 58.67% 42.23%
19.65% 32.85% 29.23% 71.28% 4.66% 6.87% 36.23%
22.06% 4.41% 14.53% 4.74% 9.93% 13.14% 8.16%
11.40% 2.21% 7.50% 2.38% 3.71% 6.05% 3.90%
5.65% 1.09% 3.55% 1.06% 1.93% 3.16% 1.91%
3.65% 0.69% 2.42% 0.72% 1.22% 1.98% 1.24%
3.60% 0.69% 2.37% 0.69% 1.16% 1.87% 1.20%
3.48% 0.67% 2.33% 0.67% 1.15% 1.92% 1.18%
2.67% 0.52% 1.77% 0.53% 0.86% 1.46% 0.91%
8.87% 1.69% 5.94% 1.79% 2.92% 4.88% 3.04%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
49.84% 46.38% 49.09% 35.68% 30.81% 30.07% 40.44%
6.89% 16.55% 16.34% 33.08% 41.20% 46.16% 26.90%
10.18% 8.50% 7.90% 6.57% 6.37% 4.95% 7.33%
9.38% 8.01% 7.27% 5.79% 5.15% 4.23% 6.58%
5.07% 4.96% 4.49% 4.43% 3.86% 2.54% 4.16%
2.39% 1.93% 2.15% 1.85% 1.60% 2.17% 2.03%
2.73% 2.15% 2.08% 2.02% 1.62% 1.52% 2.00%
13.52% 11.52% 10.68% 10.58% 9.39% 8.36% 10.56%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

Note: The percentages presented in the table are equal to the proportions of the amounts of the line-items to the total tax non-deductible
adjustments for tax non-deductible adjusting items and to the total tax deductible adjustments for tax deductible adjusting items.
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Table 2
Variables
N

Tax Audit Adjustment / Sales

Book Tax Difference / Sales

OWNER
(Dummy)

STRESS
(Dummy)

AGE
(Years)

SIZE
Log (Total Asset)

Descriptive
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum

Descriptive Statistics by Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
428
409
414
359
297
0.0053 0.0047 0.0046 0.0063 0.0050
0.0027 0.0024 0.0020 0.0023 0.0018
0.0077 0.0084 0.0080 0.0144 0.0088
0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0753 0.1082 0.0824 0.1594 0.0698
0.1170
0.1216 0.1380 0.1771 0.2391
0.0819 0.0717 0.0730 0.0524 0.0366
0.1535 0.2245 0.3580 0.5846 0.8339
0.0000 0.0013 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000
2.2968 3.2994 5.8204 7.1969 8.2427
0.6100 0.5900 0.5900 0.5700 0.5900
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.4890 0.4920 0.4930 0.4960 0.4920
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.7500 0.6400 0.5000 0.3100 0.2000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.4310 0.4820 0.5010 0.4650 0.3970
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
3.7600 4.7400 5.8000 6.7900 7.7800
3.0000 4.0000 5.0000 6.0000 7.0000
1.7590 1.7660 1.8000
1.8110 1.8390
2.0000 3.0000 4.0000 5.0000 6.0000
9.0000 10.0000 11.0000 12.0000 13.0000
11.4341 11.5861 11.7600 11.8063 11.9045
11.3508 11.5012 11.6904 11.7812 11.8791
0.7824 0.8022 0.7850 0.8159 0.9189
9.5783 9.8228 9.9093 9.6232 9.8957
13.6954 14.8073 14.6085 14.7226 14.9606
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2003
300
0.0046
0.0016
0.0104
0.0000
0.1315
0.2968
0.0447
0.8384
0.0001
6.6344
0.5900
1.0000
0.4930
0.0000
1.0000
0.2400
0.0000
0.4280
0.0000
1.0000
8.8100
8.0000
1.8100
7.0000
14.0000
12.0402
12.0352
0.9303
9.9051
14.8300

Pooled
2207
0.0051
0.0022
0.0098
0.0000
0.1594
0.1725
0.0629
0.5347
0.0000
8.2427
0.5900
1.0000
0.4920
0.0000
1.0000
0.4700
0.0000
0.4990
0.0000
1.0000
6.0500
6.0000
2.4670
2.0000
14.0000
11.7296
11.6739
0.8548
9.5783
14.9606

Table 3
Variables

Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Comparison of Mean, Median and Variance by Period

Descriptive
Statistics

Period I
(1998-2000)

Period II
(2001-2003)

Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum

1251
0.0049
0.0024
0.0080
0.0000
0.1082
0.1255
0.0762
0.2587
0.0000
5.8204
0.6000
1.0000
0.4910
0.0000
1.0000
0.6300
1.0000
0.4820
0.0000
1.0000
4.7600
4.0000
1.9610
2.0000
11.0000
11.5916
11.5179
0.8004
9.5783
14.8073

956
0.0054
0.0020
0.0117
0.0000
0.1594
0.2339
0.0442
0.7524
0.0000
8.2427
0.5800
1.0000
0.4940
0.0000
1.0000
0.2500
0.0000
0.4360
0.0000
1.0000
7.7300
7.0000
2.0020
5.0000
14.0000
11.9102
11.8877
0.8897
9.6232
14.9606

N
Tax Audit Adjustment /
Sales

Book Tax Difference /
Sales

OWNER
(Dummy)

STRESS
(Dummy)

AGE
(Years)

SIZE
(LogTA)

Test for Equality of Means
(Independent Sample T-Test)
Equal Variance Equal Variance
Assumed
Not Assumed
T
P
T
P
1.171

0.242

1.116

Test for Equality of Median
Kruskal-Wallis
Test
Chi-Square Asym. P

0.000

4.268

0.462

-0.734

0.000

-19.283

0.000

34.866

0.000

8.702

11.304

0.001

104.688

0.000

2.098

0.148

137.236

0.000

0.768

0.381

10.263

0.001

0.005

0.000

73.496

0.000

0.462

N/A #

N/A #

0.000

311.125

0.000

0.000
811.164

8.826

7.933

0.000
310.984

34.962

0.005

0.463
0.540

-19.022

P

0.000
64.133

-0.735

F

0.265
7.822

4.745

Median
Test
Chi-Square Asym. P

Test for Equality
of Variance
(Levene’s Test)

0.000

469.305

0.000

0.000
77.702

# Median Test for OWNER cannot be performed, as all values are less than or equal to the median.
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0.000

57.444

0.000

Table 4
Variables
TAXADJ
BT
POST00
POST00*BT
OWNER
STRESS
AGE
SIZE

TAXADJ

BT

1.000
0.310*
0.000
0.025
0.242
0.314*
0.000
-0.017
0.422
-0.018
0.410
-0.009
0.688
-0.305*
0.000

1.000
0.101*
0.000
0.924*
0.000
-0.021
0.327
-0.109*
0.000
0.108*
0.000
-0.209*
0.000

Pearson Correlations Matrix
POST00 POST00*BT OWNER STRESS

1.000
.228*
0.000
-0.016
0.462
-0.375*
0.000
0.597*
0.000
0.185*
0.000

1.000
-0.015
0.473
-0.147*
0.000
0.175*
0.000
-0.170*
0.000

* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
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1.000
0.025
0.241
-0.065*
0.002
0.071*
0.001

1.000
-0.312*
0.000
-0.031
0.139

AGE

SIZE

1.000
0.209* 1.000
0.000
-

Table 5 Pooled Regression of Tax Audit Adjustment on Book Tax Difference
Variables
Expected Sign Coefficient t-value p-value Tolerance
Explanatory Variables
BT
+
0.030
1.265
0.206
0.549
POST00
+
0.062*
2.723
0.007
0.592
POST00*BT
+
0.100*
4.220
0.000
0.553
Control Variables
OWNER
0.029
1.575
0.115
0.936
STRESS
+
-0.031
-1.617
0.106
0.833
AGE
?
-0.097*
-4.258
0.000
0.592
SIZE
?
-0.450*
-23.568 0.000
0.849
INDUSTRY
Not Reported
N: 2207
Adjusted R-square: 0.318
F: 61.597
p-value: 0.000

VIF
1.822
1.689
1.809
1.068
1.201
1.689
1.178

* Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
Ln(TAXADJ)=a0+a1BT+a2POST00+a3POST00*BT+a4OWNER+a5STRESS+a6AGE+a7SIZE+aiINDUSTRYi+ei
where:
Dependent variable:
Ln(TAXADJ) = natural logarithm of tax audit adjustments divided by sales revenue.
Explanatory variables:
BT
= pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by sales revenue.
POST00
= 1, if tax audit adjustments are made for the fiscal years subsequent to 2000, zero otherwise.
Control variables:
OWNER
= 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of institutional shares, zero otherwise.
STRESS
= 1, if the company issues new stocks in the next two years, zero otherwise.
AGE
= number of years since the initial public offering.
SIZE
= natural logarithm of total assets.
INDUSTRYi are dummy variables to control for firm fixed effects.
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Table 6 Sensitivity Tests
Panel A1: Annual Regressions of Tax Audit Adjustment on Book Tax Difference
Variables

Expected
Sign
+
+
?
?

BT
OWNER
STRESS
AGE
SIZE
INDUSTRY
N
Adjusted R-square
F
P

Coef.
0.012
0.057
0.022
0.000
-0.398*

1998
T
0.259
1.294
0.502
0.001
-8.850
428
0.211
8.604
0.000

P
0.796
0.196
0.616
0.999
0.000

Coef.
0.036
0.010
-0.005
-0.051
-0.439*

1999
T
0.811
0.212
-0.103
-1.123
-9.713
409
0.227
9.005
0.000

P
0.418
0.832
0.918
0.262
0.000

Coef.
0.073
0.022
-0.019
-0.056
-0.410*

2000
T
P
Coef.
1.678 0.094 0.186*
0.490 0.625 0.055
-0.449 0.654 -0.023
-1.285 0.199 -0.084
-9.142 0.000 -0.390*
Not Reported
414
0.249
10.129
0.000

2001
T
4.041
1.229
-0.515
-1.868
-8.341

P
0.000
0.220
0.607
0.063
0.000

359
0.334
12.972
0.000

Coef.
0.142*
0.005
-0.073
-0.121
-0.504*

2002
T
2.918
0.110
-1.559
-2.503
-10.115

P
0.004
0.913
0.120
0.013
0.000

297
0.374
12.776
0.000

* Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
Ln(TAXADJ)t=a0t+a1tBT+a2tOWNER+a3tSTRESS+a4tAGE+a5tSIZE+aitINDUSTRYit+eit

(t=1998,…2003)

where:
Dependent variable:
Ln(TAXADJ) = natural logarithm of tax audit adjustments divided by sales revenue.
Explanatory variables:
BT
= pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by sales revenue.
Control variables:
OWNER
= 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of institutional shares, zero otherwise.
STRESS
= 1, if the company issues new stocks in the next two years, zero otherwise.
AGE
= number of years since the initial public offering.
SIZE
= natural logarithm of total assets.
INDUSTRYi are dummy variables to control for firm fixed effects.
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Coef.
0.139*
0.027
-0.044
-0.105
-0.514*

2003
T
2.824
0.563
-0.955
-2.229
-10.061
300
0.408
15.737
0.000

P
0.005
0.574
0.340
0.027
0.000

Table 6 Sensitivity Tests (Continued)
Panel A2: Regressions of Tax Audit Adjustment on Book Tax Difference by Period
Variables

Expected sign

BT
OWNER
STRESS
AGE
SIZE
INDUSTRY

+
+
?
?

N
Adjusted R-square
F
P

Period I (1998-2000)
Period II (2001-2003)
Coefficient
T
P
Coefficient
T
P
0.040
1.571 0.116
0.156*
5.796 0.000
0.028
1.114 0.265
0.029
1.089 0.276
-0.005
-0.205 0.838
-0.043
-1.688 0.092
-0.040
-1.554 0.120
-0.120*
-4.588 0.000
-0.419*
-16.287 0.000
-0.472*
-17.000 0.000
Not Reported
1251
956
0.247
0.392
28.348
41.994
0.000
0.000

* Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
Ln(TAXADJ)p=a0p+a1pBT+a2pOWNER+a3pSTRESS+a4pAGE+a5pSIZE+aipINDUSTRYip+eip

(p=1,2)

where:
Dependent variable:
Ln(TAXADJ) = natural logarithm of tax audit adjustments divided by sales revenue.
Explanatory variables:
BT
= pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by sales revenue.
Control variables:
OWNER
= 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of institutional shares, zero otherwise.
STRESS
= 1, if the company issues new stocks in the next two years, zero otherwise.
AGE
= number of years since the initial public offering.
SIZE
= natural logarithm of total assets.
INDUSTRYi are dummy variables to control for firm fixed effects.
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Table 6 Sensitivity Tests (Continuted)
Panel B: Pooled Regression with Tax Audit Adjustment and Book Tax Difference Scaled by Total Assets
Variables
Expected Sign Coefficient t-value p-value Tolerance
Explanatory Variables
BT
+
-0.077
-1.261
0.208
0.103
POST00
+
0.025
0.869
0.385
0.481
POST00*BT
+
0.290*
4.615
0.000
0.097
Control Variables
OWNER
0.013
0.635
0.525
0.936
STRESS
+
0.076*
3.531
0.000
0.833
AGE
?
-0.032
-1.252
0.211
0.590
SIZE
?
-0.269*
-12.591 0.000
0.841
INDUSTRY
Not Reported
N: 2207
Adjusted R-square: 0.156
F: 24.949
p-value: 0.000

VIF
9.700
2.081
10.336
1.069
1.200
1.696
1.190

* Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
TAXADJ=a0+a1BT+a2POST00+a3POST00*BT+a4OWNER+a5STRESS+a6AGE+a7SIZE+aiINDUSTRYi+ei
where:
Dependent variable:
Ln(TAXADJ) = natural logarithm of tax audit adjustments divided by sales revenue.
Explanatory variables:
BT
= pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by sales revenue.
POST00
= 1, if tax audit adjustments are made for the fiscal years subsequent to 2000, zero otherwise.
Control variables:
OWNER
= 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of institutional shares, zero otherwise.
STRESS
= 1, if the company issues new stocks in the next two years, zero otherwise.
AGE
= number of years since the initial public offering (IPO).
SIZE
= natural logarithm of total assets.
INDUSTRYi are dummy variables to control for firm fixed effects.
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Table 6 Sensitivity Tests (Continued)
Panel C1: Pooled Regression for the Sample of Zero and Negative
Tax Audit Adjustment and Book Tax Difference Scaled by Sales Revenue
Variables
Expected Sign Coefficient t-value p-value Tolerance
VIF
Explanatory Variables
BT
?
-0.770
-1.298 0.195
0.003
325.342
POST00
?
0.041
1.050
0.294
0.694
1.441
POST00*BT
?
0.190
0.320
0.749
0.003
325.232
Control Variables
OWNER
?
-0.009
-0.246 0.806
0.868
1.151
STRESS
?
-0.018
-0.530 0.597
0.914
1.095
AGE
?
-0.038
-0.956 0.339
0.681
1.469
SIZE
?
-0.002
-0.050 0.960
0.860
1.163
INDUSTRY
Not Reported
N: 592
Adjusted R-square: 0.361
F: 20.611
p-value: 0.000

* Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
Ln(TAXADJ)=a0+a1BT+a2POST00+a3POST00*BT+a4OWNER+a5STRESS+a6AGE+a7SIZE+aiINDUSTRYi+ei
where:
Dependent variable:
Ln(TAXADJ) = natural logarithm of tax audit adjustments divided by sales revenue.
Explanatory variables:
BT
= pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by sales revenue.
POST00
= 1, if tax audit adjustments are made for the fiscal years subsequent to 2000, zero otherwise.
Control variables:
OWNER
= 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of institutional shares, zero otherwise.
STRESS
= 1, if the company issues new stocks in the next two years, zero otherwise.
AGE
= number of years since the initial public offering (IPO).
SIZE
= natural logarithm of total assets.
INDUSTRYi are dummy variables to control for firm fixed effects.
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Table 6 Sensitivity Tests (Continued)
Panel C2: Pooled Regression for the Sample of Zero and Negative
Tax Audit Adjustment and Book Tax Difference Scaled by Total Assets
Variables
Expected Sign Coefficient t-value p-value Tolerance
Explanatory Variables
BT
?
-0.076
-0.950 0.343
0.239
POST00
?
0.056
1.193
0.233
0.697
POST00*BT
?
-0.145
-1.824 0.069
0.239
Control Variables
OWNER
?
0.009
0.208
0.836
0.871
STRESS
?
-0.015
-0.363 0.717
0.912
AGE
?
0.036
0.758
0.449
0.678
SIZE
?
-0.053
-1.244 0.214
0.834
INDUSTRY
Not Reported
N: 592
Adjusted R-square: 0.105
F: 5.095
p-value: 0.000

VIF
4.179
1.435
4.180
1.148
1.097
1.474
1.198

* Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
TAXADJ=a0+a1BT+a2POST00+a3POST00*BT+a4OWNER+a5STRESS+a6AGE+a7SIZE+aiINDUSTRYi+ei
where:
Dependent variable:
TAXADJ = tax audit adjustments divided by total assets.
Explanatory variables:
BT
= pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by total assets.
POST00 = 1, if tax audit adjustments are made for the fiscal years subsequent to 2000, zero otherwise.
Control variables:
OWNER = 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of institutional shares, zero otherwise.
STRESS = 1, if the company issues new stocks in the next two years, zero otherwise.
AGE
= number of years since the initial public offering (IPO).
SIZE
= natural logarithm of total assets.
INDUSTRYi are dummy variables to control for firm fixed effects.
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Table 6 Sensitivity Tests (Continued)
Panel D1: Pooled Regression for the Main Sample Including Zero and Negative
Tax Audit Adjustment (codes as 1) and Book Tax Difference Scaled by Sales Revenue
Variables
Expected Sign Coefficient t-value p-value Tolerance
Explanatory Variables
BT
?
0.057
0.611
0.542
0.030
POST00
?
-0.015
-0.653
0.514
0.538
POST00*BT
?
-0.045
-0.484
0.629
0.030
Control Variables
OWNER
?
0.038
2.228
0.026
0.930
STRESS
?
0.030
1.686
0.092
0.832
AGE
?
-0.056*
-2.617
0.009
0.584
SIZE
?
-0.436*
-25.053 0.000
0.882
INDUSTRY
Not Reported
N: 2799
Adjusted R-square: 0.253
F: 56.640
p-value: 0.000

VIF
32.974
1.860
33.102
1.075
1.202
1.712
1.133

* Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
Ln(TAXADJ)=a0+a1BT+a2POST00+a3POST00*BT+a4OWNER+a5STRESS+a6AGE+a7SIZE+aiINDUSTRYi+ei
where:
Dependent variable:
Ln(TAXADJ) = natural logarithm of tax audit adjustments divided by sales revenue.
Explanatory variables:
BT
= pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by sales revenue.
POST00
= 1, if tax audit adjustments are made for the fiscal years subsequent to 2000, zero otherwise.
Control variables:
OWNER
= 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of institutional shares, zero otherwise.
STRESS
= 1, if the company issues new stocks in the next two years, zero otherwise.
AGE
= number of years since the initial public offering (IPO).
SIZE
= natural logarithm of total assets.
INDUSTRYi are dummy variables to control for firm fixed effects.
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Table 6 Sensitivity Tests (Continued)
Panel D2: Pooled Regression for the Main Sample Including Zero and Negative
Tax Audit Adjustment (codes as 1) and Book Tax Difference Scaled by Total Assets
Variables
Expected Sign Coefficient t-value p-value Tolerance
Explanatory Variables
BT
?
-0.078
-1.678
0.093
0.146
POST00
?
0.016
0.655
0.513
0.515
POST00*BT
?
0.220*
4.663
0.000
0.141
Control Variables
OWNER
?
0.014
0.757
0.449
0.930
STRESS
?
0.090*
4.637
0.000
0.831
AGE
?
-0.003
-0.131
0.896
0.582
SIZE
?
-0.275*
-14.298 0.000
0.846
INDUSTRY
Not Reported
N: 2799
Adjusted R-square: 0.124
F: 24.340
p-value: 0.000

VIF
6.841
1.942
7.085
1.075
1.204
1.718
1.182

* Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
TAXADJ=a0+a1BT+a2POST00+a3POST00*BT+a4OWNER+a5STRESS+a6AGE+a7SIZE+aiINDUSTRYi+ei
where:
Dependent variable:
TAXADJ) = tax audit adjustments divided by total assets.
Explanatory variables:
BT
= pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by total assets.
POST00
= 1, if tax audit adjustments are made for the fiscal years subsequent to 2000, zero otherwise.
Control variables:
OWNER = 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of institutional shares, zero otherwise.
STRESS = 1, if the company issues new stocks in the next two years, zero otherwise.
AGE
= number of years since the initial public offering (IPO).
SIZE
= natural logarithm of total assets.
INDUSTRYi are dummy variables to control for firm fixed effects.
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Appendix I
Panel A: China’s Accounting Standards Issued by 2003
Accounting Standard for
Promulgation
Effective
Revision Date
Business Enterprises
Date
Date
Basic Standard
Nov 30, 1992
July 1, 1993
Disclosure of Related Party
May 22, 1997
Jan 1, 1997
Relationships and Transactions
Cash Flow Statements
March 20, 1998
Jan 1, 1998
Jan 18, 2001
Events Occurring After the
May 12, 1998
Jan 1, 1998
April 14, 2003
Balance Sheet Date
Debt Restructuring
June 12, 1998
Jan 1, 1999
Jan 18, 2001
Revenue
June 20, 1998
Jan 1, 1999
Investments
June 24, 1998
Jan 1, 1999
Jan 18, 2001
Construction Contracts
June 25, 1998
Jan 1, 1999
Changes in Accounting Policies
And Accounting Estimates, and
June 25, 1998
Jan 1, 1999
Jan 18, 2001
Corrections of Accounting
Errors
Non-monetary Transactions
June 28, 1999
Jan 1, 2000
Jan 18, 2001
Contingencies
April 27, 2000
July 1, 2000
Intangible Assets
Jan 18, 2001
Jan 1, 2001
Borrowing Costs
Jan 18, 2001
Jan 1, 2001
Leases
Jan 18, 2001
Jan 1, 2001
Interim Financial Reporting
Nov 2, 2001
Jan 1, 2002
Inventories
Nov 9, 2001
Jan 1, 2002
Fixed Assets
Nov 9, 2001
Jan 1, 2002
Notes:
(1) All the above standards are applicable to publicly traded companies in China.
(2) The new effective dates of those revised standards are Jan 1, 2001, except the
new effective date July 1, 2003 of Events Occurring After the Balance Sheet Date.

Panel B: China’s Accounting Systems and Other Regulations Issued by 2003
Title
Promulgation Date Effective Date
Accounting System for Listed Companies
Jan 27, 1998
Jan 1, 1998
Accounting System for Business Enterprises
Dec 29, 2000
Jan 1, 2001
Accounting System for Financial Institutions
Nov 27, 2001
Jan 1, 2002
Enterprises Financial Accounting
June 21, 2000
Jan 1, 2001
Reporting Ordinance
Accounting Law of
Oct 31, 1999
July 1, 2000
The People’s Republic of China
Notes:
(a) All the above accounting rules are applicable to publicly traded companies in
China.
(b) Accounting System for Listed companies was abolished after Accounting System
for Business Enterprises became effective on January 1, 2001.
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Appendix II
Significant Reforms of Accounting and Income Tax Rules in China
Year

Accounting Regulations

Income Tax Law for
Foreign Investment Enterprises
and Foreign Enterprises

1991

1992

Income Tax Regulations

Accounting Regulation for
Experimental Listed Companies
Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises
– Basic Standards

1993

Enterprise Financial General Standards
Enterprise Financial and Accounting Systems

1994

Enterprise Income Tax Law

1995
1996

1997

Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises
- Disclosure of Related Party
Relationships and Transactions
Accounting Systems for Listed Companies

1998

1999

Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises
- Cash Flow Statements
- Events Occurring After the Balance Sheet Date
Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises
- Debt Restructuring
- Revenue
- Investments
- Construction Contracts
- Changes in Accounting Policies And
Accounting Estimates, and
Corrections of Accounting Errors
Accounting Law

2000

Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises
- Non-monetary Transactions
- Contingencies

Enterprise Income Tax Pretax
Deduction Approaches

Notes: All the above rules are classified into corresponding periods according to their
effective dates of their latest editions.
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Significant Reforms of Accounting and Income Tax Rules in China (Continued)
Year

Accounting Regulations

Income Tax Regulations

Accounting Systems for Business Enterprises
Enterprises Financial
Accounting Reporting Ordinance

2001

Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises
- Cash Flow Statements (Revised)
- Debt Restructuring (Revised)
- Investments (Revised)
- Changes in Accounting Policies And
Accounting Estimates, and
Corrections of Accounting Errors (Revised)
- Non-monetary Transactions (Revised)
- Intangible Assets
- Borrowing Costs
- Leases
Accounting Systems for Financial Institutions

Supplementary Documents
(e.g., Circular on modification

of pre-tax deduction standards
of advertising expenses
for certain industries;
Circular on taxation on
commission charges from
checkoff of personal income
tax on interest revenues
of saving deposits)

Supplementary Documents
(e.g., Circular on corporate

income tax of national debt
interests after trial
Accounting
Standards
for
Business
Enterprises
2002
implementation of net-price
- Interim Financial Reporting
trading of national debts;
- Inventories
Circular on taxation policies
- Fixed Assets
Concerning re-employment of
laid-off unemployed persons)
Supplementary Documents
(e.g., Approaches of income

tax treatments on debt

2003

Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises
restructuring transactions;
- Events Occurring After the Balance Sheet
Circular on income tax
Date (Revised)

concerning the implementation
of Accounting Standards
for Business Enterprises)

Notes: All the above rules are classified into corresponding periods according to their
effective dates of their latest editions.
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Appendix III
Major Differential Items
Between Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises and Tax Rules
Item
Accounting Treatments
Tax Treatments
Category 1
Sales-equivalent
Do not need to recognized as
Recognized as
transactions
revenue.
revenue.
Sales revenue from
preliminary operation of
construction in process

Write down the costs of the
construction project.

The revenue should
be charged into
taxable income.

Technology transfer
revenue

Recognized as revenue.

Revenue less than
RMB300,000 is
exempted from
taxation.

Cash dividends or interest
on current investments

Write down the carrying value
of investment upon receipt.

Recognized as
revenue.

Long-term equity
investments (equity
method)

Adjust the carrying amount of
the investment according to its
attributab1e share of the
investee enterprise's net profit
or loss, and recognize it as
investment income for the
current period accordingly.

Investment loss
should not be
recognized if net loss
of the investee
enterprise occurs.

Long-term debt
investments

Interest should be recognized
as revenue periodically based
on par value and interest rate.

Interest revenue from
national debts does
not need to be
charged into taxable
income.

Bad debt provision

The method and amount of bad
debt provision can be
determined by the enterprises
according to the specific
situations.

The amount of bad
debt provision should
not exceed 0.5% of
the ending balance of
accounts receivables

Provision on impairment
of inventories, current
investments, long-term
investments, fixed assets,
construction in process,
intangible assets, and
consigned loans

Charged into corresponding
costs, expenses or losses
accounts.

The amount is not
deductible from
taxable income.

Category 2
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Major Differential Items
Between Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises and Tax Rules
(Continued)
Item
Accounting Treatments
Tax Treatments
Category 2 (Continued)

Depreciation of
capital assets

Depreciation methods, including
straight-line method, units-ofproduction method, doubledeclining balance method, and
sum-of-the-years-digits method,
can be adopted. The expected
useful life and estimated residual
value can be determined based on
the specific situation of the capital
assets.

In general, straight-line
depreciation method should
be used except special cases.
The minimum useful life is
stipulated for different
categories of capital assets.

If the relevant contract does not
stipulate the beneficial period and
Amortization of
the law does not stipulate the
intangible assets
effective period, the amortization
period should not exceed 10 years.

The amortization period
should not be less than 10
years.

Amortization of
initial
establishment
expenditures

Charged to the expenses for the
period of the establishment of
business.

The amortization period
should not be less than 5
year since the
commencement of the
operation of business.

Management
fees to higher
authorities

Recognized as expenses.

The upper limit of deductible
amount is 2% of total
revenue.

Research and
development
expenses

Recognized as expenses.

Business
entertainment
expenses

Recognized as overhead expenses.

Salary expense

Charged into corresponding
accounts of costs and expenses.
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If the research and
development expenditures of
the eligible enterprises
increase by more than 10%,
50% of the actual
expenditures are deductible.
The upper limit of deductible
amount is 5% of net sales
revenue for the enterprises
with net sales revenue less
than RMB15 million, and
3% for those with net sales
revenue more than RMB15
million.
Salary expense cannot be
deducted over a certain limit.

Major Differential Items
Between Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises and Tax Rules
(Continued)
Item
Accounting Treatments
Tax Treatments
Category 3

Advertising
expenses

Charged into operational
expenses.

In general, the advertising
expenses in a fiscal year should
not exceed 2% of sales
revenue, or 8% for a certain
industries. For some industries,
the advertising expenses are
not deductible.

Business
promotion
expenses

Charged into operational
expenses.

The business promotion
expenses should not exceed
0.5% of sales revenue.

Charged into operational
expenses.

The commission fees paid to
individuals should not exceed
5% of the total amount of
service fees except some
special cases.

Expenses related to
fund raising for the
purpose of
production and
operation

Charged into financial
expenses.

When the amount of loans
obtained from the related
parties exceeds 50% of
registered capital, the interest
expenses of the excess portion
are not deductible.

Borrowing costs

Borrowing costs, except the
costs incurred for the
purpose of purchase and
construction of fixed assets,
should be charged into
financial expenses for the
current period.

Borrowing costs for the
purpose of investments should
be recognized as costs of
investments and are not
deductible.

Commission fees

Category 4
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Major Differential Items
Between Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises and Tax Rules
(Continued)
Item
Accounting Treatments
Tax Treatments
Category 5

Donation
expenditures

Charged into
extraordinary expenses.

Donation expenditures for public
benefit and relief can be deductible
with the upper limit of 3% of
taxable income (1.5% for donations
by financial institutions. Besides,
the donation expenditures are
deductible in some cases, and are
not deductible in some other cases.

Sponsoring
expenditures

Charged into
extraordinary expenses.

Non-advertising sponsoring
expenditures are not deductible.

Penalty
expenditures

Charged into
extraordinary expenses.

The following penalty expenditures
are not deductible: 1) penalty of
illegal operations and loss of
confiscated properties; 2) overdue
fines and other penalty
expenditures related to taxation.

Long-term equity
investments
acquired in
exchange for nonmonetary assets

The initial costs of
investments should be
determined according to
the carrying value of the
assets surrendered.

Equivalent to sales of nonmonetary assets at the fair value
and charged into taxable income.

Debt settlement

The differential amount
from debt restructuring
should be recognized as
capital surplus or
extraordinary loss.

Debt payable should be charged
into taxable income if debt can not
be settled owing to debtee.

68

Bibliography
Alexander, D., and H. R. Schwencke. 1997. Accounting Changes in Norway – A
Description and Analysis of the Transition from a Continental Towards and AngloSaxon Perspective on Accounting. 20th Annual Congress of the European
Accounting Association, Graz, Austria (April 23-25).
Ali, A., and L. S. Hwang. 2000. Country-Specific Factors Related to Financial
Reporting and the Value Relevance of Accounting Data. Journal of Accounting
Research 38 (Spring): 1-21.
Ball, R., and P. Brown. 1968. An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income
Numbers. Journal of Accounting Research 6(2): 159-178.
Beatty, A., S. L. Chamberlain, and J. Magliolo. 1995. Managing Financial Reports of
Commercial Banks: The Influence of Taxes, Regulatory Capital, and Earnings.
Journal of Accounting Research 33(2): 231-261.
Beatty, A., and D. G. Harris. 1999. The Effects of Taxes, Agency Costs and
Information Asymmetry on Earnings Management: A Comparison of Public and
Private Firms. Review of Accounting Studies 4(December): 299-326.
Bradley, F. 1994. An Empirical Investigation of Factors Affecting Corporate Tax
Compliance Behavior. Ph.D. Dissertation. The University of Alabama. Ann Arbor:
UMI Dissertation Services.
Chan, K. H., and P. Mo. 2000. Tax Holidays and Tax Noncompliance: An Empirical
Study of Corporate Tax Audits in China’s Developing Economy. The Accounting
Review 75 (October): 469-484.
Chan, K. H. and P. Mo. 2002. The Impact of firm Characteristics on Book-Tax
Conforming and Book-Tax Difference Audit Adjustments. The Journal of the
American Taxation Association 24 (Fall): 18-34.
Chen, S. M., Z. Sun, and Y. T. Wang. 2002. Evidence from China on Whether
Harmonized Accounting Standards Harmonize Accounting Practices. Accounting
Horizon 16 (3): 183-197.
Chen, X. Y., X. Xiao, and X. Y. Guo. 2000. Stock Rights Issue and Listed
Companies’ Earnings Management. Economic Research Journal 1: 30-36.
Cloyd, B. 1995. The Effects of Financial Accounting Conformity on
Recommendations of Tax Preparers. The Journal of the American Taxation
Association 17 (Fall): 50-70.
Cloyd, B., J. Pratt, and T. Stock. 1996. The Use of financial Accounting Choice to
Support Aggressive Tax Positions: Public and Private Firms. Journal of Accounting
Research 34 (Spring): 23-43.
Dhaliwal, D., M. Frankel, and R. Trezevant. 1994. The Taxable and Book Income
Motivations for a LIFO Layer Liquidation. Journal of Accounting Research 32(2):
278-289.
Dhaliwal, D., and S. W. Wang. 1992. The Effect of Book Income Adjustment in the
1986 Alternative Minimum Tax on Corporate Financial Reporting. Journal of
Accounting and Economics 15(1): 7-26.

69

Dechow, P. 1994. Accounting Earnings and Cash Flows as Measures of Firm
Performance: The Role of Accounting Accruals. Journal of Accounting and
Economics 18(1): 3-42.
Eberhartinger, E. L. E. 1999. The Impact of Tax Rules on Financial Reporting in
Germany, France, and the UK. International Journal of Accounting 34 (1): 93-119.
FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board). SFAC No. 2 – Qualitative
Characteristics of Accounting Information. May 1980.
Fischer, R. 2004. Standardization to Account for Cross-Cultural Response Bias: A
Classification of Score Adjustment Procedures and Review of Research in JCCP.
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 35(3): 263-282.
Frankel, M., and R. Trezevant. 1994. The Year-End LIFO Inventory Purchasing
Decision: An Empirical Test. Accounting Review. 69(2): 382-398.
Gao, J. P. 2001. Analysis of Differences between the New Accounting System and
Tax Law. China Finance and Economics Publishing.
Gao, Y. B. 2003. Comparison of Accounting and Tax Regulations and Tax
Adjustments. Dongbei University of Finance and Economics Press.
Guenther, D. A. 1994. Earnings Management in Response to Corporate Tax Rate
Changes: Evidence from the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Accounting Review 69(1): 230243.
Guenther, D. A., E. L. Maydew, and S. E. Nutter. 1997. Journal of Accounting and
Economics 23 (3): 225-248.
Gujarati, D. N. 2003. Basic Econometrics (Fourth Edition). McGraw-Hill Higher
Education.
Haller, A. 1992. The Relationship of Financial and Tax Accounting in Germany.
International Journal of Accounting 27: 310-323.
Heckman, J. J. 1979. Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econometrica
47(1): 153-162.
Healy, P., and J. Wahlen. 1999. A Review of the Earnings Management Literature
and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons 13 (December): 365383.
Henderson, B. C. and S. E. Kaplan. 2005. An Examination of the Role of Ethics in
Tax Compliance Decisions. Journal of the American Taxation Association 27 (1):
39-72.
Hunt, A., S. E. Moyer, and T. Shevlin. 1996. Managing Interacting Accounting
Measures to Meet Multiple Objectives: A Study of LIFO Firms. Journal of
Accounting and Economics 21(3): 339-374.
Joint Committee on Taxation (US). 2003. Report of Investigation of Enron
Corporation and Related Entities Regarding Federal Tax and Compensation Issues,
and Policy Recommendations (JCS-3-03).
Joint Committee on Taxation (US). 2003. Written Testimony of the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation on the Report of Investigation of Enron Corporation and
Related Entities Regarding Federal Tax and Compensation Issues, and Policy
Recommendations (JCX-10-03).

70

Kim, D. S. 1999. A Standardization Technique to Reduce the Problem of
Multicollinearity in Polynomial Regression Analysis. Bulletin of the International
Statistical Institute: The 52nd Session Proceedings (58).
Klassen, K. J. 1997. The Impact of Inside Ownership Concentration on the Trade-Off
Between Financial and Tax Reporting. Accounting Review 72(3): 455-474.
Kothari, S. P. 2001. Capital Markets Research in Accounting. Journal of Accounting
and Economics 31: 105-231.
Lamb, M., C. Nobes, and A. Roberts. 1998. International Variations in the
Connections Between Tax and Financial Reporting. Accounting and Business
Research 28 (Summer): 173-188.
Liu, K. C., and W. G. Zhang. 1996. Contemporary Accounting Issues in China: An
Analytical Approach. Simon & Schuster (Asia) Pte Ltd: Prentice Hall.
Liu, Y. T. 2001. Chinese Characters of the Accounting System for Business
Enterprises and Its Harmonization with International Practice. Accounting Research
3.
MacKie-Mason, K. 1992. Commentary on The Corporate Tax Gap: Evidence on Tax
Compliance by Small Corporations (by E. Rice). In Why Peiople Pay Taxes, edited
by J. slemrod, 125-161. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Matsunaga, S., T. Shevlin, and D. Shores. 1992. Disqualifying Dispositions of
Incentive Stock Options: Tax Benefits Versus Financial Reporting Costs. Journal of
Accounting Research 30(Supplement): 37-76.
Maydew, E. L. 1997. Tax-Induced Earnings Management by Firms with Net
Operating Losses. Journal of Accounting Research 35(1): 83-96.
Maydew, E., K. Schipper, L. Vincent. 1999. The Impact of Taxes on the Choice of
Divestiture Method. Journal of Accounting and Economics 28(2): 117-150.
Mikhail, M. B. 1999. Coordination of Earnings, Regulatory Capital and Taxes in
Private and Public Companies. Working Paper.
Mills, L. 1996. Corporate Tax Compliance and Financial Reporting. National Tax
Journal 49 (3): 421-435.
Mills, L. 1998. Book-Tax Differences and Internal Revenue Service Adjustments.
Journal of Accounting Research 36 (Autumn): 343-356.
Mills, L., and K. Newberry. 2001. The Influence of Tax and Nontax Costs on BookTax Reporting Differences: Public and Private Firms. The Journal of the American
Taxation Association 23 (Spring): 1-19.
Mills, L., and G. A. Plesko. 2003. Bridging the Reporting Gap: A Proposal for More
Informative Reconciling of Book and Tax Income. National Tax Journal 56
(December): 865-893.
Mills, L., and R. Sansing. 2000. Strategic Tax and Financial Reporting Decisions:
Theory and Evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research 17 (Spring): 85-106.
Motorin, M. 2000. Accounting Reform Issues in Russia. The Third Meeting of the
Russian Corporate Governance Roundtable: The Role of Disclosure in Strengthening
Corporate Governance and Accountability, Moscow.

71

Murray, N. 1995. Sales Tax Compliance and Audit Selection. National Tax Journal
48 (4): 515-530.
Nichols, D. C., J. M. Wahlen. 2004. How Do Earnings Numbers Relate to Stock
Returns? A Review of Classic Accounting Research with Updated Evidence.
Accounting Horizon 18 (December): 263-286.
Ohlson, J. 1980. Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy.
Journal of Accounting Research 18 (Spring): 109-131.
Porcano, T., and A. Tran. 1998. Relationship of Tax and Financial Accounting Rules
in Anglo-Saxon Countries. The International Journal of Accounting 33 (4): 433-454.
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 2000. Brazil – An Overview of Accounting, Audit, and
Tax.
Rahman, M. Z., L. Schwarz, and H. Fortin. 2004. Mexico – Accounting and Auditing.
Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), World Bank.
Rice, E. 1992. The Corporate Tax Gap: Evidence on Tax Compliance by Small
Corporations. In Why Peiople Pay Taxes, edited by J. slemrod, 125-161. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Scholes, M. S., G. P. Wilson, and M. A. Wolfson. 1990. Tax Planning, Regulatory
Capital Planning, and Financial Reporting Strategy for Commercial Banks. Review of
Financial Studies 3(4): 625-650.
Scholes, M. S., and M. Wolfson. 1992. Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning
Approach. Prentice Hall, Inc., Engelwood Cliffs, NJ.
Scott, W. 1997. Financial Accounting Theory. Prentice Hall, Inc., NJ.
Shackelford, A., and T. Shevlin. 2001. Empirical Tax Research in Accounting.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (1-3): 321-387.
Shen, Z. Y., J. S. Wang, and S. Xue. 2004. Earnings Management and Changes in the
Accounting Standard on Bad Debt Provisions – Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms.
China Accounting and Finance Review 6 (2): 112-128.
Takatera, S., and S. Daigo. 1989. The Impact of International Pressures on Japanese
Accounting: A Critical Perspective on the Emergent Issues. In International
Pressures for Accounting Change, edited by A. G. Hopwood, 187-199. Prentice Hall.
Watts, R., and J. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Watts, R., and J. Zimmerman. 1990. Positive Accounting Theory: A Ten Year
Perspective. Accounting Review 65(January): 131-156.
Working Group on Accounting Standards, OECD. 1987. Accounting Standards
Harmonization No.3 – The Relationship between Taxation and Financial Reporting.
Ministry of Finance, PRC
The State Administration of Taxation (SAT), PRC

72

